The Up-C Revolution by Polsky, Gregg D. & Rosenzweig, Adam H.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2018
The Up-C Revolution
Gregg D. Polsky
University of Georgia School of Law, gregg.polsky@uga.edu
Adam H. Rosenzweig
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis
University of Georgia School of Law
Research Paper Series
Paper No. 2016-40
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Gregg D. Polsky and Adam H. Rosenzweig, The Up-C Revolution , 71 Tax L. Rev. 415 (2018),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1189
The Up-C Revolution
GREGG D. POLSKY* & ADAM H. ROSENZWEIG**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over twenty-five years ago, the Internal Revenue Service approved
the classification of limited liability companies (LLCs) as partnerships
for tax purposes.' Since then, discussions of the implications of this
development on the classical corporate tax system have pervaded the
literature, especially after the 1998 promulgation of the check-the-box
regulations that made tax classification of LLCs elective. 2 Neverthe-
less, despite these supposed path-breaking events, the corporate form
has proven stubbornly persistent in the post-LLC era. The apparent
conflict between the tax advantages of LLCs and the persistence of
corporations has proven difficult for the academic literature to
explain.3
This era is coming to a close. In its place is arising what we refer to
as the "Up-C Revolution." The Up-C Revolution represents a sea
* Francis Shackelford Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of
Law.
** Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, Washington University in
Saint Louis School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, we
would like to thank Eric Allen, Ellen Aprill, Herbert Beller, Bradley Borden, Yariv
Brauner, Alfred Brophy, Christopher Bruner, David Cameron, Charlotte Crane, Victor
Fleischer, David Gamage, Brant Hellwig, Jeffrey Kahn, Leandra Lederman, Charlene
Luke, Steve Johnson, Michael Knoll, Sarah Lawsky, Andrew Lund, Omri Marian, Martin
McMahon, Philip Postlewaite, Katherine Pratt, Usha Rodrigues, Chris Sanchirico, Richard
Schmalbeck, Jeffrey Sheffield, Gladriel Shobe, Reed Shuldiner, Eric Sloan, Nancy Staudt,
Kathleen Thomas, David Walker, Robert Wootton, Ethan Yale, Lawrence Zelenak, and
participants at tax colloquia workshops at the law schools of Duke University, the
University of Florida, Loyola Law School-Los Angeles, Northwestern University, and the
University of Pennsylvania, as well as the participants at the Annual Critical Tax
Conference. Special thanks to Robert Daily and Han Liu for their excellent research
assistance.
1 Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (1988), declared obsolete in Rev. Rul. 98-37, 1998-2
C.B. 133 (1998).
2 Reg. § 301.7701-3; see generally George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business En-
terprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the "Check-the-Box" Regulations, 51
SMU L. Rev. 125 (1997) (discussing the background behind check-the-box regulations).
3 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L.
Rev. 1737 (1994); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capi-
tal Start-Ups, 57 Tax L. Rev. 137 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Ven-
ture Capital Start-Up: The Myth of Incorporation, 55 Tax Law. 923 (2002); Calvin
Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development Deductions, 29
Va. Tax Rev. 29 (2009).
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change in tax-entity selection and restructuring, combining the best
attributes of corporations and LLCs into a single dominant structure.
This Article provides a comprehensive overview of the Up-C Revolu-
tion, describing the Up-C structure, explaining its primary use as a
tax-efficient vehicle for initial public offerings of LLCs, and exploring
some of the future implications of the Up-C Revolution for tax
planning.4
In an Up-C structure, a C corporation is placed atop an LLC, which
is owned partially by the C corporation and partially by other inves-
tors, typically individuals and private investment partnerships such as
venture capital (VC) or private equity (PE) funds. These investors
also receive exchange rights that allow them to periodically tender
their LLC interests for equivalent-value stock in the parent C corpo-
ration. When these exchanges occur, they are taxable exchanges to
the investors and result in a stepped-up basis in a proportional part of
the LLC's assets.5 This stepped-up basis will reduce the C corpora-
tion's future taxable income and often its future tax liability.6 The
investors typically receive the benefit of such tax reductions through a
tax receivable agreement (TRA) that requires the parent C corpora-
tion to pay the investors a specified percentage-usually 85%-of
these future tax reductions as they materialize.7
The Up-C structure is becoming increasingly common as the choice
of structure when LLCs or other flow-through entities are taken pub-
lic." This "Up-C IPO" structure first appeared in the mid-2000's
4 The Up-C structure has received limited attention in the literature, and the attention it
has received has focused mostly on the Up-C IPO and the use of tax receivable agreements
in particular. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer & Nancy Staudt, The Supercharged IPO, 67 Vand.
L. Rev. 307 (2014); Alexander Edwards, Michelle Hutchens & Sonja 0. Rego, The Pricing
and Performance of Supercharged IPOs (Kelley Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. 16-14,
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725531; Gladriel Shobe, Supercharged IPOs and the Up-
C, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 913 (2017). There has been a robust practitioner literature on the
use of the structure and some of the doctrinal issues surrounding it. See, e.g., Phillip W.
DeSalvo, The Staying Power of the UP-C: It's Not Just a Flash in the Pan, 152 Tax Notes
865 (Aug. 8, 2016); Martin D. Ginsburg, Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, Mergers, Ac-
quisitions, and Buyouts ¶ 1602.10 (2016); Jeffrey N. Bilsky & Avi D. Goodman, The Up-C
Partnership IPO Structure, BDO Perspective (BDO USA), Winter 2015, at 1-2; John C.
Hart, The Umbrellas of Subchapter K (2016), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/
related-link-pdfs/umbrellas-of-subchapter-k.pdf?sfvrsn=6; Deborah Paul & Michael Sab-
bah, Understanding Tax Receivable Agreements (2013), Practical Law Article 7-530-5945.
5 This assumes that the LLC makes an election under § 754. See Reg. § 1.743-1 (noting
methodology for LLC to step up its basis in case of sale or exchange of partnership
interest).
6 If the corporation's taxable income is negative, the stepped-up basis will result in addi-
tional net operating losses, which may or may not eventually reduce the corporation's tax
liability.
7 See Paul & Sabah, note 4, at 2.
8 See Simpson Thacher, The "UP-C" Structure: A Primer on Employing the Umbrella
Partnership-C-Corporation Structure in an IPO, https://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-
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before the beginning of the financial crisis, which significantly de-
pressed the IPO market. Many attribute the first use of the now-
called "Up-C IPO structure" to the 2006 initial public offering of
Evercore Partners. 9 Up-C IPOs continued to trickle out from 2007
through 2012, with two or three filings on average in each of those
years.10 Beginning in 2013, the Up-C Revolution began in earnest
with at least twelve Up-C IPOs filed in 2013, and at least another sev-
enteen filings in 2014.11 A slowdown in the IPO market greatly re-
duced the amount of going-public transactions beginning in the
second half of 2015, but there were still reportedly fourteen Up-C
IPOs filed that year.1 2 In 2016 and 2017, there were another nineteen
Up-C IPOs reported.13 The tremendous growth in Up-C IPOs, from
two or three per year from 2006 through 2012 to over seventy since
2013 is particularly noteworthy. As explained below, while the struc-
ture is extremely attractive from a tax perspective, it also adds quite a
source/related-link-pdfsup-c-slides.pdf?sfvrsn=6; see also John LeClaire & Brad Weber,
The Up-C IPO: A Structure That Keeps on Giving, Buyouts, Feb. 9, 2015 (noting that Up-
C IPOs have become more common in recent years). At times this has been referred to as
a "super-charged IPO" in the literature. See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 312. But, as
Gladriel Shobe explains, while the Up-C IPO is the most common type of supercharged
IPO, the term can encompass other structures. See Shobe, note 4, at 929-39.
9 See Ian Fontana Brown, The UP-C IPO and Tax Receivable Agreements: Legal
Loophole?, 156 Tax Notes 859 (Aug. 14, 2017). The 1999 IPO of barnesandnoble.com
used a version of the Up-C structure. See id. at 862-63; Hart, note 4, at 20, 26 n.40, 40.
Before the IPO, the company's business was operated through an LLC owned equally by
Barnes & Noble, Inc. (B&N) and Bertelsmann AG. See Hart, note 4 at 26. In the IPO,
shares of a new holding company (formed as a corporation) were sold to the public, and
the corporation used the proceeds to buy additional membership interests from the LLC.
B&N and Bertelsmann had the right to exchange their LLC interests for equivalent stock
interests in the holding company that went public. The transaction thus looked like a typi-
cal Up-C IPO. The parties, however, did not execute a TRA in connection with the IPO
and, as discussed in the text, TRAs are core components in the modern Up-C IPO struc-
ture. Brown, supra, at 862.
10 See Brown, note 9, at 863. These counts exclude filings for companies whose IPOs
never closed. See Gregg Polsky, Spreadsheet of Up-C Filings from 2012-2017(on file with
the author).
11 See Brown, note 9, at 863. A study by the law firm Goodwin Procter LLP found that
between 2008 and 2012, only eleven Up-C IPOs were consummated, an average of approx-
imately two per year, and then in 2013, the floodgates opened. See LeClaire & Weber,
note 8, at 1. In 2013 alone, twelve Up-C IPOs were filed (and all of which were ultimately
closed), followed by seventeen Up-C filings in 2014 (all but one of which closed or are still
pending). Id. The trend continued in 2015 with the high profile Up-C IPOs of Go Daddy
and Shake Shack closing in early 2015. See Morrison & Foerster, Practice Pointers on the
Up-C Structure (2016), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160500practicepointersupc-
structure.pdf; Matt Egan, GoDaddy Races onto Wall Street, Stock Soars 30% After IPO,
CNN Money (Apr. 1, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/investing/godaddy-ipo-tech-
danica-patrick/index.html.
12 See Polsky, note 10.
13 See id.
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bit of complexity.1 4 The exponential growth suggests that private in-
vestment funds, lawyers, and tax advisors are becoming increasingly
aware of the structure's tax benefits and the market increasingly com-
fortable with its complexity. A tipping point apparently has been
reached, and nothing short of radical reform of business entity taxa-
tion may be able to stop this momentum.
Despite this ongoing Up-C Revolution, the Up-C structure (and
TRAs) has received scant attention in the literature.' 5 This is surpris-
ing, not only because of their trendiness but also because of their sig-
nificant implications for taxpayers and the federal government even
beyond the IPO context. For example, Up-Cs could impact the initial
choice-of-entity analysis, and they can be used to effectuate transac-
tions that mimic tax-free reorganizations or corporate inversions with-
out abiding by the strict conditions that otherwise would apply.
Given this widespread impact, the Up-C Revolution seems to re-
present the market fulfillment of earlier predictions that LLCs would
fundamentally change the role of corporations in society, albeit not in
the ways originally predicted. Rather than ring the death knell of the
corporate form, the markets instead will integrate the LLC into the
corporate form. No longer will VC-funded start-ups need be formed
as C corporations; no longer will PE funds require LLC portfolio com-
panies to convert to C corporations; no longer will public mergers
need to comply with the strict tax-free reorganization requirements of
§ 368; no longer will domestic companies be limited to seeking similar
sized merger partners to engage in inversions. The list is potentially
endless. The only constraint on the use the Up-C structure (at least
under current tax law) is participant and advisor awareness and mar-
ket acceptance, both of which have seemingly already turned the
corner.
Part II provides background and context to the Up-C Revolution,
describing the impact of tax law in traditional IPO and merger and
acquisition markets. Part III explains the rise of the LLC as a busi-
ness form and discusses the implications and complications that arose
from the introduction of LLCs into the traditional IPO and mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) markets. Part IV introduces the Up-C struc-
ture, using the Up-C IPO structure as a case study. Part V discusses
some of the major implications of the Up-C revolution on tax plan-
ning, from choice-of-entity considerations to equity compensation de-
sign and the structuring of M&A and cross-border transactions. That
Part also considers the normative question of whether Up-C struc-
tures should be legislatively foreclosed. Part VI concludes.
14 See Shobe, note 4, at 947 (noting high administrative costs associated with Up-Cs).
15 Id. at 917 (noting that Up-C structures have been "mostly overlooked" by scholars).
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II. ENTITY TAXATION AND THE NEED FOR THE UP-C STRUCTURE
A. Overview of M&A Tax Structuring
As we explain in greater detail below, Up-C structures are tax-effi-
cient because they allow the buyer to obtain a stepped-up basis in the
selling business's assets at minimal marginal cost. 1 6 The stepped-up
basis often reduces the business' future tax liabilities, and because this
tax reduction comes at minimal marginal cost, the effect of the
stepped-up basis in the Up-C structure is akin to printing money. In
traditional M&A tax planning, however, the question of whether to
structure for a stepped-up basis is more complicated because there is
often a significant marginal cost in doing so. 17 In a traditional M&A
transaction, tax planners must weigh the future tax benefits of the
stepped-up basis against the immediate tax costs of generating it.
Therefore, to understand why the Up-C structure is so advantageous,
it is helpful to understand this critical tax planning issue in traditional
M&A transactions.
In these transactions, one company, P, acquires another company,
T, either through a merger, purchase of stock, or purchase of assets.
While there may be some important nontax considerations in how the
transaction is accomplished, tax considerations often drive the struc-
ture.1 8 There are three ways to structure the deal from a tax perspec-
tive: tax-free reorganization, taxable stock purchase, and taxable
asset purchase.
1. Tax-Free Reorganization
In a tax-free reorganization, the major tax benefit is a deferral of
tax owed by Ts shareholders. 19 In a tax-free reorganization, any gain
inherent in the T stock owned by the T shareholders generally is de-
ferred and built into the basis of P stock received in the transaction. 20
Thus, the gain (and associated tax liability) is generally deferred until
the P stock is eventually sold. If, however, a T shareholder who is an
individual holds the P stock until death, the gain (and associated tax
liability) is eliminated through the § 1014 step-up of basis at death.21
16 See Subsection II.A.3.
17 See Michael L. Schler, Basic Tax Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 Penn St. L.
Rev. 879, 888-89 (2012).
18 See id. at 880 ("Most importantly, it is vital for the corporate lawyer to consult a tax
lawyer at every stage of an acquisition transaction.").
19 Id. at 883.
20 IRC §§ 368, 354, 358. If the T shareholder receives cash or other property other than
.P stock (boot), the T shareholder recognizes the inherent gain in the T stock to the extent
of the value of the boot received. IRC §§ 1001, 368, 354.
21 IRC § 1014.
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Even if the P stock is not held until death, deferral can significantly
reduce the effective tax rate on the inherent gain. For example, with a
7% discount rate, a tax rate of 20% in thirty years is equivalent to a
tax rate of only 2.6% today.22
While tax-free reorganizations provide deferral for the T sharehold-
ers, there are two main drawbacks. First, to qualify as a reorganiza-
tion, a substantial amount of the consideration paid by P must be in
the form of P stock and, to maximize the deferral benefits to the T
shareholders, the vast majority of the consideration must be in the
form of P stock.23 Thus, if P wants to pay more than a relatively insig-
nificant amount of cash, the tax-free reorganization structure gener-
ally either will be unavailable or ineffective in providing the desired
tax deferral. 2 4
Second, even if the buyer is willing to pay all or nearly all of its
consideration in P stock, a tax-free reorganization provides P with a
carryover basis in the T assets, whereas a taxable asset deal would
provide it with a stepped-up basis.25 Because P is receiving a low car-
ryover basis, it typically will be willing to pay less for T because P's
future tax liability often will be higher than if it was receiving a
stepped-up basis. 26 The amount of this discount depends on a host of
factors, including the types of assets that T owns, the appropriate dis-
count rate applied to the future tax reductions, and P's future tax
rates. In the typical case, most of the missing stepped-up basis would
be attributable to T's goodwill, which would have been amortizable by
P on a straight-line basis over fifteen years.27 Assuming the vast ma-
jority of the step-up is attributable to goodwill (which is generally a
reasonable assumption), a discount rate of 10%, and a 40% combined
federal and state marginal tax rate for P, P should be willing to pay a
premium equal to approximately 20% of the amount of the step-up, if
the transaction is structured to provide it with a stepped-up basis. 2 8
Because reorganizations do not deliver P with a stepped-up basis, it
will not pay this premium in those transactions.
2. Taxable Stock Purchase
If P acquires all of the T stock by purchase-either through volun-
tary sales or through a reverse triangular merger-and the transaction
22 0.026 = .
23 See IRC § 368; see also Schler, note 17, at 885.
24 Id.
25 IRC § 362(b).
26 See Schler, note 17, at 885.
27 See IRC § 197.
28 See Schler, note 17, at 887.
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does not qualify as a reorganization, the T shareholders generally will
recognize all of the inherent gain in their stock immediately. They
thus would pay immediate tax, albeit often at preferential capital gains
rates.29 Compared to a tax-free reorganization, taxable stock
purchases accelerate capital gains tax and eliminate the opportunity
for individuals to avoid tax altogether by holding P stock until death.
While T shareholders generally are worse off in a taxable stock
purchase as compared with a reorganization, P is mostly indifferent as
between the two.30 P will have a carryover basis in the T assets in
each case.3 1 Thus, as between a reorganization or a taxable stock
purchase, the reorganization structure is preferred provided that it is
an available option32 because the T shareholders are generally better
off and P is not worse off.
3. Taxable Asset Purchase
From the T shareholders' perspective, a taxable asset purchase of T
immediately triggers two levels of tax.33 First, when T sells its assets
to P, T owes corporate tax on the net gain in those assets. 34 Second,
when T distributes the resulting after-tax proceeds to its shareholders
in complete liquidation, the shareholders pay capital gains tax on the
inherent gain in their T stock.35 Under current federal and state tax
rates, the combined tax burden can approach 50%, making taxable
asset purchases typically unattractive for T shareholders. 36
From P's perspective, however, taxable asset purchases provide it
with a stepped-up basis, which, as discussed above, is worth a pre-
mium of approximately 20% of the stepped-up basis under realistic
assumptions.37 Thus, P would prefer a taxable asset purchase. How-
ever, the cost to the T shareholders of doing a taxable asset deal is,
29 IRC § 1(h)(1)(C).
30 See Schler, note 17, at 887 (noting that "[m]ost significantly for [P], the tax basis of
the Target assets will remain unchanged, rather than reflecting' [P's] purchase price for the
stock.").
31 Id.; IRC § 362(b). In a taxable stock purchase, P will take a higher basis in the T stock
than it would in a reorganization, but the amount of P's basis in the T stock is generally a
trivial matter. See Schler, note 17, at 887 (tax basis will not provide P with any tax benefit
until P sells the stock).
32 As discussed in note 23 and accompanying text, to qualify as a reorganization and to
provide significant deferral benefits, all or mostly all of the acquisition currency must be in
the form of P stock. Thus, a reorganization is generally attractive only if P is publicly
traded so that the former T shareholders can easily sell their interests.
33 See Schler, note 17, at 888.
34 IRC § 1001.
35 IRC § 311.
36 For example, assuming a 26% combined state and federal corporate tax and a 30%
combined state and local capital gains tax, the effective combined tax rate would be 48%.
37 See text accompanying note 28.
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except in certain narrow circumstances, often higher than the benefit
to P of a stepped-up basis.38 This makes sense because, in a taxable
asset deal, while the T shareholders are bearing an immediate corpo-
rate tax on the net gain inherent in Ts assets, P is obtaining only
future tax deductions in precisely the same amount of the net gain.
Because of the time value of money, the tradeoff of $x of current tax
liability for future tax relief of $x is not a good one. 3 9
As a result, taxable asset purchases generally make sense only if
one of the two layers of immediate tax typically borne by the T share-
holders can be eliminated or at least substantially mitigated. T-level
tax will be eliminated or mitigated if T has substantial NOLs carryfor-
wards from prior years; these NOLs will absorb some or all of the T
level gain.40 Likewise, T-level tax is avoided if T is an S corporation. 41
S corporations do not pay corporate tax;4 2 instead all of the gain flows
through to the T shareholders, who are taxed once and only once on
the gain. Finally, if T is a controlled subsidiary of another corpora-
tion, gain on the distribution of the net after-tax proceeds from T to
its corporate parent is not taxed. 43 In these three cases there is only
one level of tax borne by the T shareholders. 44 In these situations, the
benefit to P from the stepped-up basis usually exceeds the cost to the
T shareholders of moving from a taxable stock purchase (which also
requires one level of tax) to a taxable asset purchase and, therefore, a
taxable asset purchase may be the more tax-efficient structure.
In summary, tax-free reorganizations are generally the most tax-ef-
ficient M&A structure, even though they result in a carryover basis
for P. If a tax-free reorganization is unavailable or unattractive be-
cause P is paying too much cash in the transaction, the transaction
typically is structured as a taxable stock purchase even though it
leaves P with a carryover basis. This is because the immediate double
taxation of T shareholders is more significant, on a present value ba-
sis, than the benefits that P would receive from a stepped-up basis. If,
however, T has large NOLs, is an S corporation, or a controlled sub-
sidiary of another corporation, a taxable asset purchase will often be
tax-efficient because P receives a stepped-up basis while the T share-
38 Schler, note 17, at 889.
39 This assumes that tax rates do not change over time, among other things. See, e.g.,
Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2005).
40 Schler, note 17, at 888; see IRC § 172.
41 Id. at 889-90.
42 IRC § 1363(a).
43 IRC § 332(a). A controlling corporation may also sell the stock of a subsidiary and
elect to treat it as a taxable asset sale. IRC § 338(h)(10); see Schler, note 17, at 890-91.
44 See Ginsburg et al., note 4, ¶ 105.
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holders avoid the second level of tax. These conclusions are summa-
rized in the table below.
TABLE 1
EFFICIENCY OF REORGANIZATION, STOCK PURCHASE, OR
ASSET PURCHASE
Transaction Consequences to Selling Consequences to Buying Caveats
Type Shareholders Corporation
Reorg Deferral of stock gains; no Carryover basis in Ts Need to have all or nearly
premium for delivering assets all of the currency in the
stepped-up basis form of P stock
Stock Immediate gain recognition Carryover basis in Ts
Purchase on stock; no premium for assets
delivering stepped-up basis
Asset Immediate double taxation; Stepped-up basis in T's Stepped-up basis premium
Purchase receive premium for deliv- assets is often less than the bur-
ering stepped-up basis den of immediate double
taxation
B. The Rise of LLCs and the Difficulties of Tax-Partnerships
1. Partnership M&A
For tax purposes, a partnership includes general and limited part-
nerships as well as LLCs and other noncorporate limited liability enti-
ties (for example, LLPs), as long as these entities are not publicly
traded. 45 While corporate income is subject to two levels of tax-once
at the corporate level when corporate income is earned and another at
the shareholder level when cash or property is distributed to share-
holders-partnership income is taxed once and only once, at the
owner level.4 6 Partnerships pay no entity-level tax; instead their taxa-
ble income flows through the entity and is taxable at the owner level.
In addition to this fundamental distinction, partnerships cannot take
advantage of the reorganization provisions,47 and sales of partnerships
(or interests therein) are generally treated, either directly or indi-
rectly, as if there were a sale of a proportionate share of a partner-
ship's underlying assets.48 Accordingly, if an LLC is acquired by a
corporation in an M&A deal, the transaction will be taxed as a taxable
asset deal.49
45 IRC § 7704; Reg. § 301.7701-1, 
-3.
46 IRC § 701.
47 IRC § 368(a), (b); Schler, note 17, at 882.
48 IRC §§ 751(a), 743(b). This assumes that the partnership has made a § 754 election.
49 The combination of partnerships, for example through a merger of LLCs for state tax
purposes, potentially could be structured to be tax-free, depending on the circumstances.
See Reg. § 1.708-1(c); Rev. Rul. 90-17, 1990-1 C.B. 119.
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While the LLC owners, with careful advance planning, could first
convert the LLC into a corporation and then, in a separate and inde-
pendent transaction, sell the stock for cash,50 the default taxable asset
purchase structure is nearly always more tax-efficient. Because of
flow-through taxation, the gain inherent in the LLC's assets will be
taxed only once, and typically most of the LLC's gains will be attribu-
table to goodwill, which is subject to preferential capital gains rates.
Thus, the buyer will pay the 20% (or so) premium for achieving a
stepped-up basis, while the LLC's owners will bear only a single level
of tax, often at capital gains rates. If converted to a stock sale, the
owners still pay a single level of tax but they forgo the 20% premium.
Consider a simple example where an LLC has a single asset of
goodwill, a zero basis in the goodwill, and the buyer is willing to pay
$100 for the LLC in a carryover basis transaction. (As mentioned
above, a carryover basis transaction is in fact unavailable without the
restructuring discussed in the previous paragraph, but for illustrative
purposes assume that such restructuring would occur.) Because of the
20% premium, the buyer would be willing to pay $120 for the LLC if
the buyer received a stepped-up basis. Assuming a 25% effective
marginal tax rate on capital gains, the LLC owners would be left with
$75 in the carryover basis transaction ($100 x (1 - .25)) and $90 ($120 x
(1 - .25)) in the stepped-up basis transaction, so they would choose the
stepped-up basis transaction. Matters become more complicated if
some of the gain inherent in the LLC's assets is ordinary income, such
as inventory gain.51 In that case, the seller of assets will suffer some
tax burden relative to the stock sale situation but on the other hand
the buyer will receive a quicker (and therefore larger in present value
terms) benefit from the stepped-up basis, because the basis of ordi-
nary assets typically is recovered more quickly than the basis of capital
gains. Even in these more complicated cases, the benefit to the buyer
from the stepped-up basis typically exceeds the detrimental character
conversion suffered by the seller, which means that the default asset
sale treatment of LLCs remains preferable.
Thus, while C corporations are often practically unable to sell assets
and give the buyer a stepped-up basis, LLCs (and, for that matter, S
corporations) are able to do so. This means that, in the case of other-
wise identical businesses with one run as a C corporation and the
other as an LLC, the latter will fetch a significantly higher purchase
price. This ability to obtain the stepped-up basis premium is one im-
50 To be effective, the first-step conversion and second-step sale would have to avoid the
application of the step transaction doctrine. Cf. Schler, note 17, at 882 (noting that a first-
step conversion and a second-step reorganization could be recast as a taxable sale if the
step transaction doctrine applied to treat the two steps as a single integrated transaction).
51 See IRC § 751(a).
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portant, albeit fairly subtle, advantage of partnerships over C corpora-
tions. The single level of taxation of profits and the flow-through of
losses tend to be the most salient advantages of LLCs,52 but the effects
of these are often overstated. Reinvesting (as opposed to immediately
distributing) profits can blunt the impact of double taxation, and stat-
utory limitations on losses can significantly impair their value.53 On
the other hand, the stepped-up basis premium on exit is an unalloyed
benefit that is simply unavailable in typical C corporation exits.
Another possibility to consider is whether LLC owners can engage
in a transaction that is effectively a tax-free reorganization with a cor-
porate acquirer. With some careful planning, this is possible. LLC
owners would have to first incorporate the LLC by, for example,
merging the LLC into a new corporation (Newco). This generally
would constitute a tax-free § 351 transaction. Then, in a separate and
independent transaction that is not amalgamated with the § 351 trans-
action under the step transaction doctrine, Newco would engage in a
tax-free reorganization with the corporate acquirer.54 For example, T
LLC would incorporate, becoming T Inc. Then, in a separate and in-
dependent transaction, T Inc. would be acquired by P (which typically
would be a publicly traded corporation), the owners of T Inc. receiv-
ing exclusively (or nearly so) P stock in a reorganization. The familiar
end result is that the owners of T LLC defer the recognition of their
gain (which is built into the basis of the P stock), while P receives a
carryover basis in Ts assets.
An interesting question is whether this "LLC reorganization" trans-
action is tax-efficient. The step transaction doctrine can be a signifi-
cant practical obstacle. That doctrine seems to require, at a minimum,
that the first-step incorporation be undertaken before the second-step
reorganization is negotiated.55 This means that the T owners would
be stuck with the risk that, if the second step never takes place, T will
be a stand-alone corporation, which is often quite undesirable. Leav-
ing this very practical problem aside, the economic issue is whether
the benefit to P in the form of a stepped-up basis exceeds the benefit
to the T owners in the form of deferral.
Quantifying the stepped-up basis benefit will be relatively easy and,
as mentioned before, will usually equal about 20% of the amount of
the step-up, which equals the amount of the gain recognized by T
owners. Assuming an effective capital gains rate of 25%, the after-tax
52 See Fleischer, note 3, at 143-44.
53 See id. at 151-64.
54 Cf. Schler, note 17, at 882 (noting that if the step transaction doctrine were impli-
cated, the transaction would not be treated as a reorganization).
55 See generally Ginsburg et al., note 4, ¶ 608 (describing the requirements and applica-
tions of the substance-over-form doctrine, including the step transaction doctrine).
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premium would equal about 15%. Quantifying the deferral benefit
for T owners is more complicated, as it depends on when each of the T
owners decides to liquidate their P stock. If a T owner sells quickly,
the deferral benefit will be negligible. If a T owner dies while holding
the T stock, the deferral benefit will be turned into an exclusion as all
of the built-in gains will be eliminated by virtue of § 1014 step-up. To
equal the after-tax 15% stepped-up basis premium, the present value
of an immediate 25% capital gains tax would have to be reduced 15
percentage points, down to 10%.56 Assuming a 7% discount rate, the
break-even holding period would be about 13.5 years, so that a 25%
capital gains tax in 13.5 years would approximate a present-value capi-
tal gains tax of 10%.57 Thus, ignoring the possibility of T owners dy-
ing while holding their P stock, if the weighted average holding period
of P stock were greater than 13.5 years, the reorganization structure
would be optimal (under the assumptions above), while if the holding
period were less, the simple asset purchase would be optimal. Adding
in the possibility of T owners dying while holding their P stock com-
plicates matters even further, but would certainly shorten the break-
even holding period to less than 13.5 years. Another complication is
that while the stepped-up basis benefit would inure to the benefit of
all T owners in the form of a premium purchase price, the deferral
benefit would disproportionately benefit T owners who are older and
those who have longer investment horizons. And, as mentioned
above, the restructuring necessary to transmute a straightforward sale
of an LLC to a reorganization can be a significant obstacle.
In the end, the benefits of a straightforward LLC sale will often
outweigh the benefit of trying to plan into reorganization treatment.
Besides the business and tax risks and planning costs, investment hori-
zons of investors in these deals are often relatively short. Professional
investment funds have maximum terms of roughly ten years, so they
typically will sell quickly. Founders and other early-stage individual
investors often desire to sell a significant portion of their interests rel-
atively quickly so as to diversify their portfolios. For these reasons, a
traditional LLC sale generally would be the optimal tax structure.
These conclusions are summarized in the table below.
56 In that case, the after-tax 15% stepped-up basis premium would equal the after-tax
fifteen percentage point reduction in the capital gains tax in a reorganization.
57 For example, assume that P would pay $120 in a straightforward purchase but only
$100 in a reorganization. T owners would end up with $90 after tax in the purchase ($120
less 25%). In a reorganization, a 25% tax in 13.5 years is, under the above assumptions,
equal to a 10% tax today, which if imposed would leave the T owners with $90.
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TABLE 2
PARTNERSHIP M&A TRANSACTION
Transaction Consequences to Selling Consequences to Buying Caveats
Type Shareholders Corporation
Traditional Immediate gain recognition Stepped-up basis in Ts
Taxable Sale (often mostly capital gain) assets
of LLC
Conversion of Immediate gain recognition Carryover basis in T's Rarely desired; requires
LLC into on second-step sale (all assets careful advance planning
Newco; then capital gain)
Sale of
Newco Stock
Conversion of Deferral of gain Carryover basis in T's Need to have all or nearly
LLC into assets all of the currency in the
Newco; Reorg form of P stock; requires
with P careful advance planning
with attendant business/tax
risks; need to weigh benefit
of deferral against cost of
COB
2. Partnership IPOs
In general, an LLC cannot go public while still preserving its part-
nership tax status. Under § 7704, once a partnership becomes publicly
traded, it is taxed as a C corporation (subject to narrow exceptions,
not relevant here58 ). Because an LLC is going to be taxed as a corpo-
ration once it goes public and because the market prefers the corpo-
rate form, a new corporation (Newco) is formed to be the vehicle
taken public. Before the recent proliferation of Up-C IPOs, the leg-
acy owners of the LLC would contribute their LLC interests to the
Newco in exchange for stock of Newco. In connection with the contri-
bution, Newco would sell shares to the public for cash.59 The contri-
bution of LLC interests and cash to Newco in exchange for all of
Newco's outstanding stock qualified the transaction as a tax-free § 351
transaction. Such qualification allowed the founders to "roll over"
their LLC interests into Newco stock in a tax-free manner, with the
inherent gain preserved in their Newco stock basis. Only if and when
the Newco stock was eventually sold would the inherent gain in the
LLC interests be taxed.
Viewed in isolation, this deferral of tax appears to be a nice tax
feature, but on the whole the traditional transaction structure frus-
trated tax planners because the purchaser (here, the public Newco)
was giving up the prospect of a stepped-up basis. There would be no
58 The exceptions cover partnerships that generate mostly passive income. IRC
§ 7704(b).
59 Shobe, note 4, at 928; Ginsburg et al., note 4, 1 1602.10.1.
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stepped-up basis at the time of the contribution because the transac-
tion qualified as a tax-free § 351 transaction, which provides for a car-
ryover basis. Nor would there be any stepped-up basis when the
legacy owners sold their Newco stock, despite the tax triggered by the
sale, or when the legacy owners died holding Newco stock, despite the
stepped-up basis in the stock basis under § 1014. On the other hand,
had the legacy owners sold their LLC interests, or died while holding
those interests, a stepped-up basis would be generated at that time.
As described above, normally when an LLC is sold, the buyer re-
ceives a stepped-up basis 6 0 and, while some restructuring (of the sort
done in the traditional IPO structure) could instead have given the
LLC owners tax deferral (and the buyer only a carryover basis), the
stepped-up basis is typically more valuable than the owners' deferral
benefit, so the parties are happy with the default taxable-asset-
purchase structure. In the IPO context, however, the parties were al-
ways intentionally structuring the transaction to provide a carryover
basis.61 In fact, we know of no examples where the IPO of an LLC
was structured as a taxable sale (with a resulting stepped-up basis),
even though it easily could have.
C. Explaining the Puzzle
Historically there was a significant dichotomy between private sales
of LLCs, where transactions were and continue to be commonly struc-
tured to deliver a stepped-up basis, and IPOs of LLCs, where stepped-
up basis was, before the advent of the Up-C IPO, completely forgone.
There appear to be three potential explanations for this inconsistency.
It is not clear to us which of these fully explains the phenomenon.
First, due to peculiarities in public company valuation, the public
market may systemically discount the value of the stepped-up basis in
the pricing of Newco stock, whether rational or irrational. Second,
due to peculiarities in the corporate tax system, the actual benefits of
a stepped-up basis may be less valuable in the hands of a public com-
pany buyer than it is in the hands of the typical private company
buyer. Third, in the private context, the transaction consideration is
rarely in the form of stock of the acquirer; therefore, the deferral ben-
efit delivered in the traditional LLC IPO structure may simply not be
available in private transactions.
60 See note 5 and accompanying text.
61 An alternative stepped-up basis transaction could easily have been structured even if
the owners of the LLC were to receive shares of Newco, as typically would be the case in
an IPO. Tax planners would take care to structure the transaction as a "busted 351 trans-
action" to ensure that it was treated as a taxable transaction rather than a tax-free § 351
transaction. See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 319 n.50.
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The first explanation-undervaluation of the stepped-up basis-is
consistent with the conventional wisdom that in the IPO context, the
buyer (that is, the public market) does not value a stepped-up basis
and therefore will not pay for it in the form of a higher price.62 Recall
that in a private acquisition an LLC worth $100 in a carryover basis
transaction could be worth $120 in a stepped-up basis transaction. If
the LLC went public, however, the conventional wisdom is that the
market would value it at $100 regardless of whether a stepped-up ba-
sis was delivered. If the public simply would not pay for the stepped-
up basis, the carryover basis transaction, with its deferral for the
LLC's owners, would be the optimal structure, according to the con-
ventional wisdom.
This conventional wisdom is itself puzzling for two separate reasons.
First, why would the public markets not value a stepped-up basis? Af-
ter all, a stepped-up basis delivers real future benefits in the form of
tax reductions. Sure, the present value of the stepped-up basis de-
pends on a variety of factors, such as the amount of future taxable
income and future marginal tax rates, but business valuation (which is
what IPO pricing is) always depends on predictions about a whole
host of future events, such as the amount of future earnings of the
business. It can be hard to understand what makes the valuation of
tax assets so different than garden variety business valuations. Sec-
ond, even if the public markets irrationally discounted a stepped-up
basis, the legacy owners could still capture their value using tax receiv-
able agreements.
1. Explaining the Mispricing of Tax Assets
The traditional account of the mispricing phenomenon relies on the
public market's use of multiples of accounting metrics, such as
EBITDA, EBIT, and earnings, without taking account of deferred tax
assets or book/tax differences. 63 Whether the company has a stepped-
up basis or carryover basis obviously does not affect EBITDA or
EBIT, because both amounts are explicitly determined without regard
62 See Bilsky, note 4, at 2 ("Wall Street research analysts, and public shareholders in
general, typically do not assign full value to the tax attributes of a company"); Gladriel
Shobe, Private Benefits in Public Offerings: Tax Receivable Agreements in IPOs, Vand. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2018). But see Robert Cyran, In Dividing Up Extra Tax Spoils, Risks
for New Investors, N.Y. Times DealBook, July 8, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
07/08/in-dividing-up-extra-tax-spoils-risks-for-new-investors/.
63 See Shobe, note 62, at 8-9, 22-23; see, e.g., Moonchul Kim & Jay R. Ritter, Valuing
IPOs, 53 J. Fin. Econ. 409, 431 (1999); cf. Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How
Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. Fin.
Econ. 343 (1989) (exploring how investment bankers use indications of interest from cli-
ents to price new issues, leading to mispricing).
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to taxes. For this reason, among others, the accounting literature as-
sumes, for the most part, that not only are tax attributes not taken into
account in determining the IPO price, but that markets may actually
discount the value of companies with deferred tax assets on the theory
that deferred tax assets serve as negative signals regarding future
earnings. 64
Further, even the amount of accounting earnings, which is deter-
mined on an after-tax basis, is not affected by the existence of a
stepped-up basis or carryover basis because of the way that generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) account for income taxes. In
a stepped-up basis transaction, the buyer generally will realize future
goodwill amortization deductions for tax purposes but not for finan-
cial accounting ("book") purposes because under the relevant finan-
cial accounting rules, goodwill is not amortizable; instead it must be
tested periodically for impairment and written down if and when im-
pairment occurs.65 Thus, the discrepancy regarding goodwill is merely
a timing difference because the book and tax goodwill amounts will
eventually be reconciled on impairment or a later sale of the business.
For that reason, the accounting rules require the buyer to immediately
realize a deferred tax asset on the balance sheet on the closing of the
acquisition. Then, for each accounting period following the acquisi-
tion, the reduction in tax liability resulting from the stepped-up basis
will be offset by a reduction in the deferred tax asset. On the other
hand, in a carryover basis transaction, there will be neither a reduction
in tax liability from a stepped-up basis nor a reduction in any deferred
tax asset (because there never was a deferred tax asset).66
To illustrate, assume that buyer purchases a company for $150, all of
which is allocable to goodwill, which will not become impaired in the
future. Taxable income and GAAP pretax earnings in Year 1 are $15,
and the tax rate is 40%. If the transaction is a carryover bases transac-
tion, even though the company steps up the basis of the goodwill for
book purposes, it does not do so for tax purposes. And, under the
accounting rules, the company does not amortize the goodwill; instead
it periodically tests the goodwill for impairment. Thus, in Year 1, the
company realizes $9 of after-tax accounting earnings, the $15 of pretax
earnings less the $6 of income taxes payable ($15 x 40%).
6 See, e.g., Edwards et al., note 4, at 13-15.
65 See Intangibles-Goodwill and Other (Topic 350): Accounting for Goodwill (a Con-
sensus of the Private Company Council), Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-02,
§H 350-20-35-67 to 350-20-35-78 (FASB 2014), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/DocumentC/
DocumentPage?cid=1176163744355&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
66 See Mollie T. Adams, Kerry K. Inger & Michele D. Meckfessel, Will Intangibles Trip
You Up?, Strategic Finance Mag. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://sfmagazine.com/post-entry/october
-2015-will-intangibles-trip-you-up/.
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If the transaction is instead structured as a stepped-up basis transac-
tion, the equivalent purchase price would be $180, because of the 20%
premium. The buyer immediately realizes a $72 deferred tax asset on
the balance sheet ($180 stepped-up basis x 40% tax rate). In Year 1,
the company incurs $1.20 of income tax liability, 40% of $3 (the excess
of $15 of taxable income less $12 ($180/15) of amortization deduc-
tions). In addition, the company realizes an additional $4.80 income
tax expense resulting from the reduction in the $72 deferred tax asset
during the year (1/15 * $72 = $4.80). In Year 1, the company realizes a
total of $6 of tax expense ($1.20 of taxes paid and $4.80 of deferred
tax asset amortization) and $9 of accounting earnings ($15 pretax
earnings less $6 of tax expense), the same result in the corresponding
carryover basis transaction.
Thus, financial accounting earnings were identical with and without
the stepped-up basis, so a valuation of a company based on a multiple
of earnings would yield the same amount. While the bottom line in-
come statement effects are unchanged (as are the amounts of
EBITDA and EBIT), the balance sheets are quite different. With the
stepped-up basis, the balance sheet on Day 1 shows a $72 deferred tax
asset, while the carryover basis balance sheet is missing that item; ac-
cordingly, the equity on the balance sheet after the stepped-up basis
transaction will be larger by that amount. 67 And, of course, the buyer
with the stepped-up basis is more valuable on a discounted cash flow
basis because it has greater future tax deductions and hence larger
cash flows (assuming the buyer is not perpetually in a tax loss posi-
tion). Under the traditional account, the public market does not place
much, if any, value on the larger equity or the greater future cash
flows at the time in IPO valuation, instead focusing (arguably myopi-
cally6 8 ) on earnings, EBIT, and/or EBITDA.
One potential problem with the traditional account is that, even if
you assume that the public market undervalues stepped-up basis, it
does not necessarily explain the historical popularity of the traditional
LLC IPO structure. This is because the LLC owners could have cap-
67 See Paul & Sabbah, note 4 (deferred tax asset on balance sheet not taken into account
in valuation).
68 There are a number of potential reasons why this might not be completely irrational.
It may simply be a form of rational ignorance, or could reflect diversification across firms
so it should average out across the entire market, and perhaps most importantly, the use of
price to earnings multiples by public markets may indicate that the public places a greater
value on growth while the use of discounted cash flows in other contexts suggest a greater
value on current cash flows. See, e.g., Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam & Bhaskaran
Swaminathan, Are IPOs Really Underpriced?, 17 Rev. Fin. Stud. 811 (2004). By contrast,
tax savings not valued by the public can potentially be used to finance private takeovers of
public companies. See Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a
Source of Value, 44 J. Fin. 611, 626 (1989).
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tured the stepped-up basis value directly (instead of through a pre-
mium sales price) by obtaining TRA rights, which would have allowed
them to effectively retain the stepped-up basis benefits that the public
market purportedly undervalued. If the value was higher than the
value of deferral (both on an expected value basis) to the sellers and
the market undervalued the stepped-up basis, then the optimal ap-
proach would be to negotiate for a TRA, not to choose a carryover
basis structure.
Proponents of the conventional wisdom might contend that the ab-
sence of TRAs in traditional IPOs does not prove the wisdom wrong.
They may argue that there was a failure of imagination regarding
TRAs, such that advisors simply did not conceive of using them to
capture the stepped-up basis benefit. We are dubious of this explana-
tion, given the sophistication of advisors in IPOs. A better explana-
tion may be that the perceived transaction costs associated with
TRAs, including administrative and investor relations costs, were
large enough to cause the LLC owners to prefer the "cleaner" deferral
benefits over messier TRA rights.
2. Rational Discounting of the Stepped-Up Basis
While the conventional wisdom focuses on the notion that, due to
valuation idiosyncrasies, public markets do not properly value a
stepped-up basis, another explanation, which to our knowledge has
not been explored in the context of LLC IPOs, is that the stepped-up
basis may simply not be worth as much to public companies as it is to
private companies. The idea here is that there are fundamental tax
differences between typical private company buyers and public com-
pany buyers.
Private buyers are often flow-through entities, either partnerships
or S corporations, so that additional depreciation and amortization
deductions generated by the stepped-up basis are reported on the in-
dividual tax returns of their owners. In some cases, a private buyer
may be a closely-held C corporation, but those private C corporations
would likely tend to have purely domestic activities.
On the other hand, the income of public companies is subject to the
corporate tax, which historically has been notoriously leaky. This re-
sulted in very low effective tax rates relative to nominal statutory
rates, especially for multinational companies, who were able to ag-
gressively move income to low-tax jurisdictions. This problem was
well understood,69 as many tax reform proposals sought to dramati-
69 See Richard Rubin, U.S. Tax Revamp Weakens Case for Companies to Shift Profit
Overseas, Wall St. J. (Apr. 29, 2018) (noting that, before the 2017 Tax Act, the tax "system
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cally lower statutory corporate tax rates while simultaneously broad-
ening the corporate tax base. 70 In short, while the effective rate of tax
on income was approximately the same as the statutory marginal rate
for individuals,71 it was often much lower for public corporations. 72
The recent 2017 Tax Act included a number of reforms that will affect
both the statutory rate and the effective rates of corporations on a
going forward basis.73
The rough valuation of a stepped-up basis that we performed above
assumes an effective marginal tax rate of 40%, which was roughly the
current top rates for individuals and corporations (before the 2017 Tax
Act). If instead we use a 25% effective marginal tax rate, the stepped-
up basis premium drops to approximately 16% (which approximates
the combined federal and state effective corporate rate after the 2017
Tax Act). After tax, the stepped-up basis premium would be only
12%. At some point, the stepped-up basis premium would drop be-
low the value of the deferral benefit, in which case the traditional IPO
structure would be preferred over a taxable sale. In those situations,
the preference for the traditional structure over a taxable sale would
be entirely rational.
3. Practical Impossibility of Deferral in Many Private
Transactions
One very distinctive feature of IPO transactions is that they provide
the legacy owners with publicly traded stock, which has the virtues of
being both highly liquid and eligible for tax deferral. On the other
hand, private deals nearly always involve nonstock consideration such
as cash and debt, which makes deferral impossible. 74 Thus, it may be
that the deferral benefit, if available, would be pursued in some pri-
vate transactions because it is greater than the stepped-up basis bene-
fit, but this would not be observed because deferral is not available
due to the nature of the acquisition currency.
incentivized corporates to move intangible assets such as patents and trademarks to low-
tax countries to concentrate reported income there"). The prospect of significant corporate
tax reform (which ended up happening in the 2017 Tax Act) would have to be considered
in valuing the stepped-up basis transaction as well.
70 See, e.g., id. (explaining that the 2017 Act dramatically lowered the corporate tax rate
while also implementing rules intended to curb profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions).
71 Once capital gains are considered, the effective rates for individuals change dramati-
cally, but the future deductions for a stepped-up basis would reduce ordinary income.
72 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest
U.S. and EU Multinationals, 65 Tax L. Rev. 375, 383 (2012).
73 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); see Rubin, note 69.
74 The installment sale rule may allow for some deferral with respect to consideration
paid in the form of the buyer's debt instruments. See generally §§ 453, 453A.
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4. Conclusion
Previous commentators have suggested that the unwillingness of the
market to price tax assets explained the traditional IPO structure. By
itself, this is not completely satisfying because owners of the LLC
could have extracted the value of the stepped-up basis through a
TRA. Other factors may have a played a much more significant role
in explaining the traditional IPO structure than have been appreci-
ated. The market may be accurately discounting stepped-up basis be-
cause of the leakiness of the public corporate tax base, especially for
multinationals. Furthermore, the deferral option is, as a practical mat-
ter, never on the table in many private transactions due to the nature
of their acquisition currency.
Regardless of the specific reason for the preference of the tradi-
tional LLC IPO structure, it was the dominant structure until the Up-
C IPO replaced it. Leaving aside transaction costs that are peculiar to
Up-Cs IPOs, these structures are more tax-efficient than traditional
IPO structures because they provide the same deferral benefits to
LLC owners while also providing for an eventual stepped-up basis.
III. THE UP-C STRUCTURE
The Up-C structure presents a unique combination of the benefits
of C corporation status (namely the ability to go public) with the ben-
efits of flow-through taxation. But the Up-C structure is complex,
with multiple components. Section A describes these components, us-
ing the Up-C IPO structure as a case study. Section B analyzes the tax
issues associated with Up-Cs under current tax law.
A. The Up-C IPO: A Case Study
As described above, traditionally when LLCs went public, the trans-
action was structured as a tax-free § 351 transaction.75 The legacy
owners would contribute their LLC interests into Newco in exchange
for Newco stock, with the public simultaneously buying shares of
Newco stock for cash. Under § 351, the legacy owners would receive
the benefit of deferral, with tax due only if and when they sold their
Newco shares. A major downside of this structure, however, was that
Newco would take a carryover basis in its assets, rather than a
stepped-up basis.76
This state of affairs was troubling to transactional tax lawyers, who
were structuring similar private transactions so as to deliver stepped-
75 See Subsection II.B.2.
76 IRC § 362(b).
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up basis. To these lawyers, it seemed as if perfectly good tax basis was
going to waste because, according to the conventional wisdom, the
buyer (that is, the public market) did not appreciate its value.77 While
we already explained that this story may actually be far more compli-
cated, the fact remained that stepped-up basis and its accompanying
tax benefits-appreciated or not-was being left on the table. As one
might expect, effectively gifting substantial amounts of money to the
federal government in such deals was not something that sophisticated
LLC owners and their white-shoe advisors enjoyed. Eventually,
clever tax planners found a solution to this problem-the Up-C IPO.
The Up-C IPO was devised to allow for a public sale of an LLC with
the LLC owners deferring tax for as long as they would like (just like
in the traditional structure) while, at the same time, providing for a
stepped-up basis.
In an Up-C IPO, as in the traditional structure, a Newco is placed
on top of the LLC, and Newco's stock is sold to the public. Unlike in
the traditional structure, Newco does not own all of the LLC's inter-
ests immediately after the IPO. Instead, Newco, using cash raised
from the IPO, purchases some of the LLC's interests (either all from
the LLC itself or partially from the LLC's legacy owners), while the
remainder of the LLC's interests continues to be held by the legacy
owners. The result is that Newco owns some, but not all, of the LLC's
membership interests. For tax purposes, the LLC remains a partner-
ship, with Newco and the legacy owners as the partners.78
If the transaction stopped there, the structure would not be very
desirable from the perspective of the legacy owners, because they
would own illiquid LLC interests. A principal purpose of an IPO is to
provide legacy owners with a liquid market in which to sell their inter-
ests in the business.79 To deal with liquidity concerns, the legacy own-
ers are granted the right to exchange their LLC interests for
equivalent-value stock in Newco.s0 They can thus "move up the
chain" from being a member of the private LLC to being a share-
holder in the public Newco.81 On an exchange, the economics are un-
affected because Newco's only asset is its interest in the LLC, which
grows commensurately when Newco receives LLC interests from an
exchanging legacy owner. Because Newco stock can be readily sold
77 See, e.g., Hart, note 4, at 50 ("These arrangements are premised on the assumption
that the public does not value such tax benefits and therefore would pay the same amount
for shares of a company that did not own these attributes.").
78 See generally Ginsburg et al., note 4, § 1602.10 (comparing the consequences of the
traditional approach of a partnership going public to the Up-C structure).
79 Shobe, note 4, at 926.
80 Id. at 934.
81 Id. at 937.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2018] 435THE UP-C REVOLUTION
on the public market, legacy owners that desire liquidity need only
exchange their LLC interests for Newco stock and thereafter sell the
Newco stock on the public market.
The exchange of LLC interests for Newco stock constitutes a taxa-
ble exchange, and therefore the legacy owner would owe capital gains
tax immediately on the exchange. 82 Typically, legacy owners would
elect to exchange only when, and to the extent, they were ready to
cash out of that portion of their interest in the company. Conse-
quently, there would be no acceleration of tax relative to the tradi-
tional IPO structure.83
From Newco's perspective, each taxable exchange by a legacy
owner is treated as a purchase of a partnership interest by Newco,
which results in a stepped-up basis for an allocable portion of the
LLC's assets. 84 For example, in an exchange involving 1% of the
LLC's interests, the LLC would receive a stepped-up basis (to the fair
market value at the time of the exchange) with respect to 1% of each
and every one of its assets, including goodwill and other intangibles.85
In turn, the stepped-up basis results in a reduction in Newco's future
corporate income tax liability. 86 This is very similar to the stepped-up
basis that would result if the IPO was instead structured as a taxable
sale. The difference is timing. In the Up-C IPO, the stepped-up basis
occurs periodically whenever legacy owners choose to exchange their
LLC interests for Newco stock. In a taxable sale of an LLC, there
would be a single stepped-up basis at the time of the sale.
The immediate stepped-up basis in a taxable sale should be taken
into account in determining the sales price. Recall that, under reason-
able assumptions, the stepped-up basis premium could be worth 20%
of the amount of the step-up. 87 While calculating and paying the
stepped-up basis premium is relatively straightforward in a simple sale
of an LLC, it is far more complicated in an Up-C IPO. Because the
stepped-up basis benefits Newco, the expected benefits from the ex-
change should, at least in theory, be built into Newcos stock price.
82 IRS, Publication No. 541, Partnerships 11 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
p541.pdf. Some of the gain recognized on the exchange of LLC interests for Newco stock
could be taxed at higher ordinary income tax rates pursuant to § 751(a), whereas all of the
gain would have been capital gain when Newco stock was sold in the traditional structure.
Thus, while the timing of tax would be no different, the effective tax rate on the owner
could be higher using the Up-C structure. However, the benefits of the tax receivable
agreements would normally dwarf the costs of this higher effective tax rate. See Hart, note
4, at 25.
83 Shobe, note 4, at 918, 946, 951.
84 This assumes that the LLC makes (or already has in effect) an election under § 754 to
trigger the stepped-up basis in its assets on the taxable exchange.
85 IRC §§ 743, 754; Hart, note 4, at 24-25.
86 Hart, note 4, at 24-25.
87 See Section II.A.
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However, as previously discussed,88 the public market may not appro-
priately value stepped-up basis. And even if the public market did
value a "one-shot" stepped-up basis, the periodic stepped-up basis re-
sulting from Up-C exchanges would be especially difficult to value.
The value would depend on the timing of future exchanges as well as
the value of the company at those times. The timing would often de-
pend on the legacy owners' idiosyncratic desires for liquidity, which
could be difficult to predict.
In light of these difficulties, instead of attempting to incorporate the
future stepped-up basis into the IPO price, Up-C IPO parties instead
use TRAs to, in effect, carve the stepped-up basis out of the deal.
TRAs provide that as Newcos tax liability is reduced by the stepped-
up basis, Newco is required to pay the exchanging legacy owner the
vast majority-typically 85%-of the tax reduction. 89 It is a win-win
for the exchanging owners and Newco: valuable assets (the stepped-
up basis) are created effectively out of thin air,90 their value is split
between the parties, and no ex ante valuation of the especially hard to
value future periodic stepped-up basis is required.
1. Economic Rights and Voting Power in UP-C IPOs
The Up-C IPO structure appears to be replacing the traditional IPO
structure when businesses operated as LLCs are taken public. Instead
of the traditional approach of contributing their LLC interests to
Newco in exchange for stock, the legacy owners of the LLC in an Up-
C structure retain some or all of their ownership interests in the LLC.
But the legacy owners generally desire to retain effective control of
the business until they substantially cash out. To accommodate the
owners' desire for control while complying with applicable securities
rules, the owners' interests in the LLC are converted to nonmanaging
interests in the LLC, and they are given "noneconomic" shares of
Newco. 91 Holders of the noneconomic shares are entitled to vote, but
are not entitled to any dividends or to any liquidating distributions. 92
Thus, the legacy owners own both (1) nonmanaging membership in-
terests, which represent a specified percentage of the economic inter-
ests (but without any voting power) in the LLC, and (2) shares of
Newco stock, which represent the same percentage of voting power
88 See Section II.C.
89 See Hart, note 4, at 25; see also Shobe, note 62, at 5.
90 In the traditional IPO structure, there would never be any stepped-up basis and there
is minimal if any marginal tax burden in moving from a traditional IPO structure to an Up-
C IPO. IRC §§ 721, 1032(a); see also Shobe, note 4, at 928, 935.
91 Shobe, note 4, at 934-37.
92 Id. at 936-37.
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(but without any economic value). After the IPO, the ownership
structure is as follows:
FIGURE 19
Public Shareholders Pre-Existing Owners
Noneconomic
voting shares
Common shares
Newco
Nonmanaging
Managing interest interests
Operating
LLC
2. Exchange Rights
Without any additional features, the Up-C IPO structure depicted
above would be deficient because the legacy owners would lack liquid-
ity. Providing these owners with liquidity is typically a principal rea-
son for taking a company public.94 To deal with the liquidity issue, the
legacy owners also receive exchange rights, which allow them to ex-
change their LLC units for Newco stock on a one-to-one basis. 95 On
the exchange, a commensurate amount of noneconomic voting shares
are extinguished. For example, if an owner elects to exchange one
LLC unit, the owner would receive one share of Newco common stock
and one noneconomic share of Newco held by the owner would be
extinguished.96
93 Figure 1 is substantially similar to the figure found in Hart, note 4, at 24.
94 Shobe, note 4, at 926. Another primary reason is to raise money to grow the business
or pay down liabilities. See, e.g., Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 315.
95 Shobe, note 4, at 936. Newco has the option to pay cash instead of stock on the
exchange, and might do so to avoid § 382 limitations. See Hart, note 4, at 22 n.35.
96 Shobe, note 4, at 936-37. Certain steps must be taken to ensure that one LLC unit
will always have the same economic value as one Newco share. On the IPO, the LLC's
ownership interests are recapitalized to ensure one-to-one correspondence. Subsequent to
the IPO, equity or debt transactions at the Newco level must trigger corresponding transac-
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Holders of the exchange rights generally would not exercise their
rights until the holder was ready to cash out of all or some of the
holder's investment in the enterprise. 97 When the legacy owner is
ready to cash out, the owner could would first exchange LLC units for
Newco stock and then sell the Newco stock for cash. In the traditional
IPO structure, the holder would have simply received Newco stock in
the first place and would hold onto the Newco stock until the holder
was ready to cash out. Therefore, the Up-C structure gives legacy
owners nearly the same deferral benefits as under the traditional
structure. 98
While the deferral benefits are similar under either structure, Up-C
IPOs provide two significant tax benefits unique to the structure.
First, because the owners remain members of the LLC before the ex-
change (as opposed to immediately becoming shareholders of Newco),
the LLC's pre-exchange income or loss continues to flow through to
the legacy owners (as well as to Newco).99 Accordingly, if the LLC
realizes income before the exchange, the income attributable to an
LLC unit held by a legacy owner is taxed once and only once to the
legacy owner. In contrast, income earned attributable to a share of
Newco stock generally would be taxed twice under the standard cor-
porate tax regime.10o Likewise, if the LLC realizes losses before the
tions at the LLC level. For example, if Newco issues additional shares to the public for
cash, Newco must use those shares to acquire additional LLC units; otherwise, the pre-
existing public shareholders' interest would be diluted, while the legacy owners' interests in
the LLC would not and, in that case, there would no longer be one-to-one economic corre-
spondence between LLC units and Newco common stock. See Hart, note 4, at 12 (discuss-
ing the importance of these steps to ensure that "economic parity is maintained" in the
context of an UPREIT, the precursor to the Up-C IPO structure).
97 Shobe, note 4, at 945-47. Further, if an investor in LLC units holds those units until
death, the heirs will receive a step-up in basis under § 1014. This step-up would permit a
tax-free exchange of the LLC interest for stock of Newco by the heirs. For many financial
investors, this may prove unlikely as they have an incentive to monetize as soon as possi-
ble. For founders or other individual investors, however, it is possible that this could arise.
The tax treatment to Newco should remain unchanged, because of basis adjustments under
§ 743 due to the step-up.
98 As discussed in more detail below, to achieve the intended tax characterization of the
Up-C IPO structure, there are contractual provisions that provide some limitations and
restrictions on the ability of the legacy owners to exercise their exchange rights. See notes
134-37 and accompanying text; see also Shobe, note 4, at 957 n.161.
99 Shobe, note 4, at 943.
100 A related tax benefit relates to the character of flow-through income. When income
flows through the LLC to the legacy owner before the exchange, the character of the in-
come is determined at the partnership level. IRC § 702. Thus, if the LLC recognizes a
long-term capital gain, the owner would recognize his or her share of those gains as long-
term capital gain, and individuals pay a much lower rate of tax on these types of gains.
IRC §§ 1(h)(1)(D), 702. On the other hand, in the traditional structure, all capital gains
after the IPO would be recognized by Newco and, because corporations receive no tax rate
preference for long-term capital gains, these gains would be taxed at ordinary corporate
rates. IRC § 11.
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exchange, the loss attributable to an LLC unit held by a legacy owner
flows through to the owner,101 whereas losses attributable to a share
of Newco stock are trapped inside the corporation. In short, the struc-
ture allows the legacy owners, during the period before the exchange,
to sidestep the less favorable corporate tax regime by remaining part-
ners in a partnership.
Second, the eventual exchange of LLC units for Newco shares effec-
tively triggers a stepped-up basis of a proportionate amount of the
LLC's assets. For example, if 1% of the LLC's units are exchanged
(for a 1% stockholding interest in Newco), the bases of 1% of each
and every one of the LLC's assets, including goodwill and other in-
tangibles, are stepped up to their fair market value at the time of the
exchange. This stepped-up basis results in additional deductions,
greater losses, or lower gains 102 for Newco in the future compared
with the traditional structure, where there would never be any corre-
sponding adjustment to the business' tax bases, even when shares of
Newco held by the legacy owners are disposed of in a taxable sale.103
3. Blocker Structures
Typically, when private investment funds (for example, VC/PE
funds) own interests in an LLC, a "blocker" corporation will be in-
serted into the ownership structure to protect the fund's tax-exempt
and foreign investors from realizing unrelated business taxable in-
come (UBTI) or effectively connected income (EC), respectively.1 0 4
Sometimes, two otherwise identical funds are set up: a main fund and
a co-investment vehicle. 05 The tax-exempt and foreign investors in-
vest through the co-investment vehicle, which itself invests in the LLC
through a corporation.1 06 Alternatively, a feeder fund structure can
be used, whereby the tax-exempt and foreign investors invest in the
fund through a blocker corporation, while other investors invest di-
101 If the owner is an individual, the losses may be subject to the passive activity and at-
risk limitations. See IRC §§ 465, 469.
102 The stepped-up basis could also be used to offset taxable income otherwise triggered
in a transaction, such as the transfer of the assets to a foreign corporation under § 367 as
part of an internal restructuring.
103 As discussed below, this is substantially similar to the result accomplished in so-
called "leveraged partnership" transactions, although a recent case has questioned the ef-
fectiveness of this structure under certain facts. Canal Corp v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199
(2010); see also Tom King, The Tax Court Capsizes a Leveraged Partnership in Canal
Corp., 65 Tax Law. 713 (2012).
104 Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and
Entrepreneurial Transactions 3-55 (Martin D. Ginsburg & Russell S. Light eds., 2017).
105 See, e.g., 1 Joseph W. Bartlett, Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restruc-
turings and Reorganizations 36-37 (2d ed. Supp. 2018).
106 Id. at 36.
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rectly in the fund.107 In either case, the blocker blocks the tax-exempt
and foreign investors from recognizing UBTI or ECI, which would
trigger undesirable U.S. tax filing obligations or consequences.
In the Up-C IPO structure, blocker corporations are usually merged
into Newco in a tax-free reorganization, with the tax-exempt and for-
eign investors receiving the publicly traded Newco stock and Newco
receiving the LLC units formerly held by the blocker. Because these
investors are going from investing in a corporation (the blocker) to
investing in another corporation (Newco), they avoid recognizing
UBTI or ECI.108 If the blocker corporation has NOLs that can be
used by Newco to reduce its future tax liability,109 the tax-exempt and
foreign investors may also be beneficiaries of a separate TRA, which
will allocate to them a portion (usually 85%) of the ultimate tax sav-
ings of the NOL that is inherited by Newco in the reorganization.
These consequences are similar to the ones that would have resulted
in the traditional LLC IPO structure.
B. Tax Issues Under Current Law
Up-C IPOs provide a combination of significant tax benefits that is
unusual in the current tax system. In particular, the Up-C IPO allows
for both (1) tax deferral by sellers and (2) a stepped-up basis for buy-
ers. As discussed in Part II, in traditional corporate M&A deals, this
combination is unavailable and the parties must choose one or the
other. Likewise, Up-C IPOs allow for a continuation of the partner-
ship form despite giving legacy owners the effective right to sell their
LLC interests on the public market (through exchanges and subse-
quent sales of Newco stock on a public stock exchange). Typically,
under § 7704, partnership taxation is foreclosed when ownership in-
terests are readily tradeable on public markets. 110 While there are ex-
ceptions to this rule, these exceptions are narrow and apply only to
passive-type businesses.111 On the other hand, Up-C IPOs can be
used regardless of the type of business.
107 Id. at 37.
108 Where the feeder structure is used, the private equity fund would first distribute the
proportional number of LLC units owned by the fund up to the corporate feeder (that is,
the blocker) in a tax-free partnership distribution. Thereafter, the corporate feeder would
be merged into Newco on a tax-free basis.
109 The blocker corporation's NOLs would represent the corporation's share of the
LLC's net losses during the time the blocker owned its interest in the LLC. Because the
merger of the blocker corporation and Newco is a tax-free reorganization, Newco inherits
the blocker's NOLs. IRC § 381. The utilization of these losses often will be subject to
certain limitations. IRC § 382.
110 IRC § 7704.
111 IRC § 7704(c)-(d); see also Shobe, note 4, at 928 n.59.
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These unprecedented tax advantages raise two separate questions.
First, could the IRS challenge Up-C IPOs under current law? Second,
as a matter of tax policy, should the tax benefits of Up-C IPOs be
allowed? In this Section, we take up the doctrinal question. In Part
V, we address the broader tax policy issues.
1. Origin of Up-Cs Out of UPREITs
The Up-C structure evolved out of the umbrella partnership real
estate investment trust (UPREIT), which has been a very common
structure in the real estate investment trust (REIT) world since the
early 1990's.112 UPREITs and Up-Cs utilize the same overall struc-
ture (including similar exchange rights), but Up-Cs involve a corpo-
rate parent that is a garden variety C corporation while UPREITs
involve a corporate parent that is a REIT."13
A REIT is a special corporate tax classification that is available only
to certain real estate related businesses.11 4 The income of REITs is
taxed only once," 5 unlike traditional corporate income, which is taxed
twice. If a real estate investor wanted to contribute its property to an
existing REIT in exchange for REIT stock, the contribution typically
would be taxed as a sale because the requirements of § 351 would not
be satisfied.11 6 The resulting immediate gain recognition significantly
discouraged contributions of real property to REITs. The UPREIT
was the solution to this tax planning problem."17
In an UPREIT, the real estate owner contributes its real estate to a
partnership owned by the REIT and the investor. Because § 721,
which applies to partnership contributions, is much more liberal than
§ 351, the contribution would be tax-free. As part of the contribution,
the real estate owner receives exchange rights to move up the chain
and receive equivalent-value REIT shares." 8 The UPREIT structure
is therefore identical to the Up-C structure except for the different
types of entity at the top of each structure.
112 See Hart, note 4, at 19 ("UPREIT structure described above was a precursor to what
has come to be known as an 'UP-C' .... ).
113 Id. (noting that the "UP-C looks very similar to an UPREIT" except that an Up-C
can invest in "not REIT-eligible" assets).
114 IRC § 856.
115 IRC §§ 857(a)(1), (b)(2)(B) (providing that a REIT is required to distribute at least
90% of its income (excluding net capital gain) each year to maintain REIT status and that
a REIT is entitled to a deduction for dividends paid, resulting in only a single level of tax
where a REIT distributes all of its profits).
116 Shobe, note 4, at 956.
117 See, e.g., Russell J. Singer, Understanding REITs, UPREITs, and Down-REITs, and
the Tax and Business Decisions Surrounding Them, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 329, 334 (1996).
118 Id. at 335.
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When Treasury initially proposed the so-called partnership anti-
abuse rules in 1994,119 the UPREIT structure was thought to be vul-
nerable to attack under the rules because the subsidiary partnership
was used solely to circumvent the § 351 rules that would have re-
quired immediate recognition. 120 The partnership anti-abuse rules
targeted partnerships that were formed to provide a favorable tax re-
sult that was not otherwise available. Though the proposed rules were
ambiguous, it appeared that the UPREIT subsidiary could be disre-
garded under the rules. If so, the UPREIT contribution would be
treated as a simple contribution of real property to the corporate
REIT, which would have triggered immediate gain recognition to the
contributing real estate owner.
Such a result was thought to be potentially devastating to the real
estate industry, as contributions to REITs would be greatly deterred.
The final drafters of the anti-abuse regulations were apparently sym-
pathetic to this concern and inserted a very favorable example into the
final regulations. 121 In the example, two partnerships contribute real
estate to a new partnership owned by the partnerships and a REIT
partner. The REIT partner goes public and contributes the cash
raised in the public offering to the newly formed partnership in ex-
change for its interest in the partnership. The two pre-existing part-
nerships receive interests that are exchangeable into stock of the
REIT after two years. The example also notes that the new partner-
ship "may make other real estate investments and other business deci-
sions, including the decision to raise additional capital for those
purposes." 122 The example concludes that this UPREIT structure did
not trigger application of the anti-abuse rules. 123
Proponents of Up-Cs cite this example for the proposition that Up-
Cs similarly do not violate the partnership anti-abuse regulations. It is
not entirely clear, however, how much comfort this regulation ought
to provide. 124 First, modern tax advisors, in both the UPREIT and
UP-C contexts, have pushed the limits on what arguably are the key
facts in this example. The example involved a two-year blackout pe-
riod during which the exchange rights could not be exercised; in mod-
ern structures the blackout period is often shorter or even
119 Prop. Reg. § 1.701-2.
120 See Hart, note 4, at 14 (noting that "viability of the UPREIT structure was briefly
threatened following" the proposed rule).
121 Reg. § 1.701-2(d)(Ex. 4); see Hart, note 4, at 16.
122 Reg. § 1.701-2(d)(Ex. 4).
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Monte A. Jackel, The Partnership Antiabuse Rule and UPREIT Structures
Revisited, 150 Tax Notes 113, 113 (Jan. 4, 2016); Shobe, note 4, at 956 (arguing that the
anti-abuse exception does not apply to Up-Cs).
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nonexistent.12 5 In the anti-abuse regulation example, the umbrella
partnership could make investments and other decisions that would
upset the one-to-one correspondence in value between units and
shares; in modern Up-C umbrella structures, the partnership is con-
tractually forbidden from making investments or otherwise doing any-
thing that would upset the one-to-one correspondence. Nevertheless,
the general consensus among tax advisors is "the differences between
the Example and a typical UPREIT transaction should not be a cause
for concern." 126
Besides these technical factual distinctions between the example
and modern-day UPREITs and Up-Cs, another issue is whether Up-C
advisors should be able to rely on an example involving an UPREIT.
While UPREITs and Up-Cs are structurally identical, the contexts in
which they arise are much different. Blessing UPREITs facilitated the
formation of REITs-a special entity created and blessed by Congress
to encourage real estate investment-by allowing for tax-free contri-
butions of real property to these entities. If UPREITs were re-charac-
terized under the anti-abuse rules, the likely consequence would be
that real property that otherwise would have been contributed to a
REIT would instead be retained by the investor, contributed to a part-
nership, or exchanged in a tax-free like-kind § 1031 exchange. Thus, if
the final regulations had concluded that UPREITs were abusive, very
little, if any, additional tax revenue would likely have been generated;
the biggest impact would have been a reduction in the amount of real
property owned by REITs. Since Congress intentionally gave a special
tax break to REITs to encourage their formation, subjecting
UPREITs to the anti-abuse rules would have frustrated that intent
while raising little, if any, additional revenue.
The stakes involved in Up-Cs are much different. First, because
Up-Cs use garden variety C corporations, the Up-C can be used re-
gardless of the type of business activity involved while UPREITs are
limited to real estate activity, which Congress intended to subsidize in
enacting the REIT regime. 127 Second, while UPREITs facilitate the
avoidance of individual income tax on real property gains (which is
easily avoided in other ways), UP-Cs facilitate the avoidance of corpo-
rate income tax by allowing a portion of a public company's income to
remain subject to partnership taxation. Third, the behavioral effects
of applying an anti-abuse rule would likely be different. If UPREIT
contributions were immediately taxable, real property owners would
likely not contribute highly appreciated property to REITs, and thus
125 See Jackel, note 124, at 114.
126 See Hart, note 4, at 18.
127 See id at 19-25.
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presumably there would therefore be little tax revenue gained. By
contrast, if Up-Cs were effectively disallowed by characterizing them
as partnership abuses, the probable behavioral response is not nearly
as clear. Perhaps many LLCs that would go public via an Up-C would
still go public using the traditional structure. Or perhaps many LLCs
would forgo an IPO and remain private. If LLCs would still go public,
disallowing Up-C IPOs would increase corporate tax revenues. But if
LLCs would choose to remain private, then disallowing Up-C IPOs
could actually reduce corporate tax revenues. This is because, once an
Up-C IPO is undertaken, eventually (after all of the legacy owners
have exchanged) all of the business's income will be subject to the
corporate tax.
This discussion of revenue impacts is policy-oriented and discussed
in more detail in Part V. As a matter of technical legal doctrine, it
seems that there is little reason that planners should not be able to
rely on the notion that what works for UPREITs also works for Up-
Cs. Regardless of the merits of the reasoning behind the anti-abuse
example, if there is no partnership abuse in the UPREIT context, then
there should be no partnership abuse in an analogous Up-C situa-
tion.128 After all, the partnerships in each case are substantively iden-
tical; the differences are only in the ways that the corporate parents
are taxed. Nevertheless, Gladriel Shobe has argued that the analogy
is flawed, given the different contexts and stakes involved.1 29 She re-
fers to the anti-abuse example as the "REIT regulations" and con-
tends that they have no relevance to Up-C transactions. But the anti-
abuse example is not a REIT regulation; instead it is part of a partner-
ship regulation and the Up-C partnership is identical in all relevant
respects to the UPREIT partnership. If, despite these similarities, the
partnership in an Up-C is deemed abusive under the partnership anti-
abuse rule and disregarded, the legacy owners would be deemed to
simply own Newco stock from the outset, resulting in the same tax
consequences as under the traditional structure (that is, no immediate
taxation and no stepped-up basis on exchanges).o30
Another potential IRS attack on Up-C IPOs could be based on the
publicly traded partnership rules. A partnership that is publicly
traded is taxed as a corporation, subject to certain exceptions not rele-
vant here.'31 In the Up-C structure, the LLC interests themselves are
not publicly traded. But, once the exchange rights are considered, the
128 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Up-C Structures in Inversions May Raise Policy Concerns,
149 Tax Notes 610, 610 (Nov. 2, 2015); Monte A. Jackel, Tax-Motivated Transactions: The
Black, the White, and the Gray, 139 Tax Notes 449, 449 (Apr. 22, 2013).
129 See Shobe, note 4, at 954-60.
130 Id. at 956-59. The incorporation transaction would qualify as a § 351 transaction.
131 IRC § 7704.
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question is whether the legacy owners are "taking into account all of
the facts and circumstances . .. readily able to . .. sell ... or exchange
their . . . [LLC] interests in a manner that is comparable, economi-
cally, to trading on an established securities market." 132 If so, the
LLC would be considered publicly traded and taxed as a corporation,
negating the Up-C structure's tax benefits.133
In an attempt to avoid this result, tax advisors place certain bells
and whistles on the exchange rights to make them less liquid. For
instance, legacy owners are often required to give advance notice
before effectuating an exchange, exchanges may be limited to certain
time periods during the year, or the number of shares exchanged dur-
ing a specified period might be capped. A provision in the regulations
under § 7704 specifically blesses exchanges with a safe harbor. Under
that rule, exchange rights would not trigger publically traded partner-
ship status as long as the exchange requires sixty days notice, places
certain limitations on the establishment of the purchase price, 134 and
caps the aggregate yearly exchanges at 10% of the LLC's interests.135
Because such limitations are anathema to legacy owners who desire
extreme liquidity, modern UPREIT and Up-C structures typically do
not attempt to fit within the safe harbor. 36 For instance, an IRS offi-
cial noted that modern structures often provide for only thirty days
notice or for the ability for legacy owners to cancel their notices prior
to the consummation of the exchange. 37 Because the safe harbor is
not satisfied, the doctrinal issue is whether the less onerous bells and
whistles used by modern tax planners are still sufficient to avoid pub-
licly traded status under the general facts-and-circumstances standard
of § 7704. The IRS official indicated that the IRS might be skeptical
of structures that stray too far from the safe harbor on the theory that
UPREIT and Up-C "structures are a bit of a gift from the
government." 3 8
132 Reg. § 1.7704-1(c)(1).
133 A "private placement" exception provides that partnerships with 100 or fewer mem-
bers generally are not considered publicly traded. Reg. § 1.7704-1(h). In many Up-C con-
texts, however, there will be more than 100 members in part because service providers of
the partnership will receive equity interests in the partnership.
134 The purchase price either (1) cannot be established until at least sixty days have
passed after notice of the exchange was first given or (2) is established not more than four
times during the LLC's taxable year. Reg. § 1.7704-1(f).
135 Id.
136 See Eric Matuszak & Robert Crnkovich, When Might an OP in an UPREIT Be a
PTP, and Why Should You Care?, 144 Tax Notes 855, 858 (Aug. 18, 2014).
137 See Amy S. Elliott, Aggressive Exchange Rights in Up-Cs, Up-REITs Concern IRS,
149 Tax Notes 1250, 1251 (Dec. 7, 2015) (noting the potential concern for abuse and saying
that if "You really end up effectively having an option ... [t]hat would trouble me." (quot-
ing Clifford Warren, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries))).
138 Id.
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In summary, the IRS could-in theory-challenge modern Up-C
structures.139 It could assert that all Up-C structures abuse the part-
nership form. But the specific example involving an UPREIT appears
to bless umbrella structures generally, regardless of the tax character
of the public parent company, notwithstanding the fact that the tax
concerns at stake in the Up-C context are very different than those in
the UPREIT context. Alternatively, the IRS could contend that while
some umbrella partnership structures may be able to pass muster,
others have strayed too far from the publicly traded partnership safe
harbors.
The latter is a case-specific approach, which raises two issues. First,
the facts-and-circumstances test would be extremely uncertain. With-
out more guidance, it would be difficult for tax planners to determine
what facts are necessary to fend off IRS attack. Second, and more
importantly, it would seem to be impossible for the IRS to draw doc-
trinal distinctions between Up-Cs and UPREITs in any coherent, ra-
tional manner. For instance, if a minimum sixty-day notice was
absolutely required to avoid publicly-traded status (as opposed to
merely representing a safe harbor), UPREITs would have to comply
with the sixty-day rule as well, even though UPREITs are, or are at
least perceived to be, less troubling policy-wise than UP-Cs. Any
partnership rule that attempts to single out Up-C structures would be
vulnerable to claims that it is arbitrary and capricious because the um-
brella partnership structures are so technically similar. In light of this,
tax advisors appear to be on reasonably solid ground in recom-
mending Up-C structures that are very similar to modern UPREIT
structures now in the market. 140
IV. TAx RECEIVABLE AGREEMENTS
The Up-C structure, while providing significant tax benefits in the
form of combining deferral and liquidity for the legacy owners and a
stepped-up basis for Newco, does not deal with the apparent valuation
problems associated with the stepped-up basis. The conventional wis-
dom is that, because of the market's myopic focus on financial ac-
counting earnings metrics, the IPO price (or, for that matter, the post-
IPO stock price) will not appropriately reflect the true economic value
139 Another less likely potential approach could be to attempt to apply the antichurning
rules under § 197 to prevent the step-up in basis attributable to goodwill. See DeSalvo,
note 4, at 869.
140 Jackel, note 128, at 449. But this does not mean that the growth of the Up-C struc-
ture is necessarily a positive (or negative) development from a tax policy standpoint. See
generally Section V.B (discussing the relevant tax policy issues).
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of the stepped-up basis created by the Up-C.1 4 1 Even if that conven-
tional wisdom is wrong, valuing the future "springing" stepped-up ba-
sis that arises from future exchanges, the timing of which can be very
uncertain, could be particularly difficult.
To solve these valuation problems, TRAs are usually used in an Up-
C IPO.142 In general, TRAs require the new public company to pay
the legacy owners a very large percentage (often 85%) of the tax sav-
ings ultimately realized by the company as a result of the stepped-up
basis triggered by any future exchanges.1 43 TRAs effectively transfer
the vast majority of the stepped-up basis benefits to the legacy own-
ers.1 44 This allows the stepped-up basis to be disregarded in setting
the IPO price of the stock. 145 Accordingly, TRA payments are viewed
as "free money" for the taking because the IPO price is assumed to be
unaffected,1 46 the legacy owners will receive the same deferral bene-
fits, and the Newco would receive 15% of the ultimate cash savings
from of the stepped-up basis. This is a win-win for everyone involved,
except of course for the government, which no longer receives the
windfall stemming from the stepped-up basis that had been left on the
table in the traditional LLC IPO structure. So powerfully beneficial is
this combination of an Up-C IPO and a TRA related to the stepped-
up basis that it is commonly referred to as a "supercharged IPO."147
A. Structure of the TRA
The two main tax advantages of the Up-C IPO over the traditional
LLC IPO structure are deferral for the legacy owners and the
141 See notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
142 See Paul & Sabbah, note 4 (arguing that "it may be that TRAs relate simply to
value" because "the IPO corporation pays for a valuable tax attribute (for example, a basis
step-up), just as a buyer of assets would normally pay more than a buyer of stock because
of the basis step-up that a buyer obtains in an asset sale. In a stock sale, the corporation's
basis in its assets generally remains unchanged."); Shobe, note 62, at 32 ("vast majority of
Up-Cs use a TRA").
143 Shobe, note 62, at 11.
144 Id.
145 See BDO, note 4, at 2 ("[I]nvestment bankers and other market professionals gener-
ally do not view a step-up coupled with a TRA obligation as a factor contributing to a
reduced market capitalization.").
146 Shobe, note 62, at 22.
147 See Shobe, note 4, at 914. Others involve a § 338(h)(10) election with a TRA and an
Up-PTP with a TRA. See Shobe, note 4, at 916-17. Up-C IPOs are one such structure.
The Up-PTP is another. In an Up-PTP, the parent is a publicly traded partnership that is
exempt from corporate tax. The publicly traded partnership owns a blocker corporation,
which blocks nonqualifying income from going up to the ultimate partner. When a legacy
owner exchanges his rights pursuant to the exchange rights, some of his interests are con-
tributed to the blocker corporation, which results in a stepped-up basis for the blocker
corporation. The tax savings from that stepped-up basis are subject to the TRA in the Up-
PTP structure. See Hart, note 4, at 27-35.
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stepped-up basis from the eventual exchange of LLC units for Newco
stock.148 Deferral directly inures to the benefit of the legacy owners.
The stepped-up basis, on the other hand, inures directly to the benefit
of Newco since Newco will, by virtue of receiving the stepped-up basis,
eventually realize lower taxable income, which will translate into
lower tax liabilities. 149 In theory, this benefit would be priced into the
IPO, and subsequent trading, prices for Newco stock. However, as
discussed above, the conventional wisdom is that public markets fail
to adequately price these tax assets. And this pricing problem is par-
ticularly acute in the context of the periodic stepped-up basis that re-
sults from future exchanges, due to uncertainty regarding the timing
of those exchanges.
To solve the stepped-up basis pricing problem, TRAs are often used
in Up-C IPOs.150 TRAs use a wait-and-see approach for valuing the
tax benefits resulting from exchanges. The agreements allocate the
vast majority of those benefits to the legacy owners, which avoids the
necessity of ex ante valuations. A TRA is a contract between the pub-
lic Newco and the legacy owners pursuant to which Newco agrees to
make annual payments to the owners in an amount determined by
reference to the tax savings generated by Newco attributable to the
stepped-up basis triggered by future exchanges. 151 The typical TRA
accomplishes this by comparing Newco's actual tax liability with a hy-
pothetical tax liability.152 This hypothetical tax liability begins with
the actual tax liability and then backs out the impact of stepped-up
basis that resulted from exchanges by the legacy owner.153
148 Another advantage is the flow-through, single taxation of income attributable to the
legacy owners' LLC units prior to exchange. This benefit stems from a distribution of
earnings as opposed to reinvestment. If income is reinvested, it is possible for the investor
to be worse off, for example, because of the higher individual income tax rate as compared
to the corporate tax rate. A related benefit is the flow-through of losses attributable to the
legacy owners' LLC units prior to exchange.
149 This assumes sufficient taxable income in the future to take advantage of the
stepped-up basis, but regardless from a financial standpoint there is value notwithstanding
this uncertainty.
150 See Shobe, note 62, at 26; Hart, note 4, at 36-37; see also Fleischer & Staudt, note 4,
at 319. If pricing problems did not exist, there would be no reason to go through the
complications of drafting, administering, and enforcing TRAs to carve tax assets out of the
deal. See Shobe, note 62, at 26.
151 Shobe, note 4, at 939 (citing Paul & Sabbah, note 4).
152 For example, the TRA used in the GoDaddy.com IPO incorporates most if not all of
these typical provisions. See GoDaddy Inc., Form of Tax Receivable Agreement (Ex-
changes) (Form S-1, Exhibit 10.4) (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1609711/000119312515042658/d728713dex104.htm [hereinafter GoDaddy TRA]. Un-
less otherwise indicated, TRA terms used in this Section refer to the GoDaddy TRA.
153 The hypothetical tax liability also assumes that Newco does not receive certain reme-
dial allocations under § 704(c) that are attributable to the exchanges that are effectively
the same as a stepped-up basis. See id.
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The difference between the actual and hypothetical tax liabilities is
often referred to in the TRA as the "realized tax benefit." 1 5 4 TRAs
typically require Newco to make a cash payment to the selling share-
holders of a specified percentage of the realized tax benefit. For what
appears to be historical and market acceptance purposes, the standard
TRA payment is 85% of the realized tax benefit.155 There does not
appear to be any good theoretical reason for 85% to become the stan-
dard.156 The theory behind TRAs-that Newco's stock price will not
incorporate the value of the stepped-up basis-would imply that the
standard could just as well be 100%. Presumably, the lesser percent is
chosen for two reasons. First, Newco bears some significant costs in
administering the TRA.157 For instance, Newco must annually calcu-
late multiple hypothetical tax liabilities. The percentage of the real-
ized tax benefit retained by the company may be viewed as
compensation for these costs. Second, by allowing the company to
retain a portion of the realized tax benefit, there is an economic incen-
tive for the company to claim, preserve, maximize, and (if challenged
by the IRS) defend the benefit. If 100% of the benefit were to inure
to the legacy owners, there would be no incentive for Newco to care.
This incentive is backstopped by fiduciary duties of directors and of-
ficers that require that they act reasonably to prevent the wasting of
corporate assets and benefits.
For tax purposes, TRA payments received by legacy owners gener-
ally are treated as contingent additional purchase price received in
exchange for the LLC interest that is swapped for Newco stock.1 58
Accordingly, when payments are made, Newco receives additional ba-
sis in the LLC's underlying assets, and the legacy owners report the
amounts on the installment method, characterizing the gain as capital
gain. 1 5 9 The theory underlying this approach is that the legacy owners
are receiving a type of deferred "earn-out" consideration. 160 Typically
earn-outs are based on future profitability; for example, a stock seller
might receive additional cash from the buyer if the business exceeds
certain earnings metrics.161 TRA payments represent similar addi-
154 See Hart, note 4, at 45.
155 Id. at 45 n.61.
156 Shobe, note 62, at 11.
157 See GoDaddy TRA, note 152.
158 Because the TRA payments are received after the date of the exchange, portions of
the payments are characterized as interest. See Paul & Sabbah, note 4.
159 Id.
160 See generally Kimberly S. Blanchard, The Taxman Cometh: Handling Earn-outs in
Business Acquisitions, Bus. L. Today, May-June 1997, at 59 (describing the tax treatment
of different types of earn-outs).
161 See, e.g., Robert R. Wootton, Taxation of the Seller in a Multi-Year Sale or Ex-
change, Taxes, Mar. 2003, at 191.
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tional purchase price even though the amounts are not directly related
to earnings. The fact that the payments are calculated by reference to
tax savings, rather than earnings, should not alter the tax character of
the payments as additional proceeds for the sale of the interests.
Thus, because the TRA payments themselves trigger additional
stepped-up basis they will result in additional future TRA payments
(assuming sufficient profitability), which triggers additional stepped-
up basis, resulting in additional TRA payments, and so on.
As a result of this cascading effect, TRA payments can accrue for a
very long time. In fact, many TRA contracts require payments to be
made indefinitely. 1 6 2 In turn, however, TRAs often also allow Newco,
at its option, to terminate the TRA payment obligation with respect to
a legacy owner's stepped-up basis by making a single lump-sum pay-
ment.163 Since the termination payment cannot be with reference to
actual future tax liability (because it is unknown at the time of pay-
ment), the TRA termination payment is based on the assumptions
that Newco will have sufficient taxable income to fully utilize the
stepped-up basis in the earliest years possible and that current tax
rates remain constant. Thus, the termination payment is based on the
fullest use of the stepped-up basis under current tax rules, with the
assumed future tax benefits discounted to present value using a speci-
fied discount rate.
B. Common Misconceptions About TRAs
TRAs have received a fair amount of attention in both the aca-
demic and practitioner literature. 164 There has also been proposed
federal legislation directed specifically at TRAs, which would man-
date that TRA payments always be characterized as ordinary in-
come; 165 under current law, TRA payments are generally
characterized as capital gains because they represent additional
purchase price received in exchange for goodwill.166 Despite all of
this attention, the discussion has often been fraught with misconcep-
tions about TRAs and their relationship to Up-Cs.
162 See Hart, note 4, at 49 (noting that the TRA's term "lasts until all relevant tax bene-
fits have been used or have expired").
163 See GoDaddy TRA, note 152.
164 See Amy S. Elliot, IPO Agreements That Shift the Basis of Step-Up to Sellers Prolif-
erate, 132 Tax Notes 334 (July 25, 2011); Fleischer & Staudt, note 4; Paul & Sabbah, note 4;
Howard Jones & Rudiger Stucke, A Cheaper Way to Do IPOs, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov. 2013,
at 32; see also Shobe, note 4, at 941.
165 H.R. 1935, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Temporary Relief Act of 2007, H.R. 3996, 110th
Cong. § 613 (2007).
166 See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 311 n.10, 344; Shobe note 4, at 944. Some portion
will be treated as imputed interest.
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1. Myth #1: TRAs and Up-Cs Are Synonymous
A common misconception about TRAs is that they are synonymous
with Up-Cs, or at least that the two are so intertwined that the policy
issues implicated by one implicate the other. For example, the term
"super-charged IPO" is sometimes used to refer a combined Up-C
IPO and TRA and critiques of the super-charged IPO structure tend
to blur the lines between the two structures. 167 In fact, the two struc-
tures, while often (but not always) going hand-in-hand, deal with com-
pletely different technical and policy issues. Yet some commentators
have not adequately separated them in their analysis, 168 which can
lead to confusion.169
TRAs are the result of tax asset pricing problems. 170 TRAs value
tax assets on an as-realized basis, allocating any cash tax savings ac-
cording to a formula. This allows the parties to disregard tax assets in
making an ex ante valuation of a business. As explained above, Up-C
IPOs create particularly acute tax asset pricing problems because of
the uncertainties regarding future exchanges. 171 It is not at all surpris-
ing that nearly all Up-C IPOs also include TRAs.1 72 Nevertheless, tax
asset pricing problems may exist outside of the Up-C IPO context,
and TRAs have occasionally been used in those cases as well. For
example, TRAs have been used in carveout IPOs, where a parent cor-
poration sells a minority interest in its subsidiary corporation to the
public.173 The transaction can include an election under § 338(h)(10),
which treats the transaction as an asset sale for tax purposes, resulting
in a stepped-up basis for the newly public subsidiary. 174 TRAs have
been used to allocate the eventual tax savings from the stepped-up
167 See, e.g., Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 319 ("A supercharged IPO ... always in-
volves a TRA... .").
168 See, e.g., id. at 317-26.
169 See Shobe, note 4, at 948-54 (explaining how Fleischer and Staudt's analysis of super-
charged IPOs was flawed because it did not separately analyze Up-Cs from the other types
of super-charged IPOs).
170 See Shobe, note 62, at 23-25.
171 See Part IV.
172 Shobe, note 62, at 26.
173 See Hart, note 4, at 41-43.
174 Id. at 42-43. TRAs have been used in so-called Up-PTPs, which are quite similar to
Up-Cs. See note 147. In an Up-PTP, the upper tier entity is not a C corporation but is
instead a PTP that qualifies for the exception to the rule that such partnerships are taxed as
C corporations. See IRC § 7704(c).
In general, the exception requires that substantially all of the PTP's income be passive
income, such as dividends, interest, and capital gains. IRC § 7704(c)(2), (d). In order to
satisfy that condition, the Up-PTP structure utilizes a blocker corporation to convert non-
qualifying income (such as compensation for services) into qualifying income (dividends
and interest). When the legacy owners in an Up-PTP exchange their interests in the lower
tier partnership for interests in the PTP, the blocker receives a stepped-up basis, which will
reduce the blocker's corporate taxes. A TRA is typically executed that allocates most of
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basis primarily to the selling corporate parent. TRAs have also been
used in situations that do not involve a stepped-up basis. For exam-
ple, at least one TRA has allocated the benefit of a corporate NOL
existing at the time of an IPO back to the legacy owners.175 Yet an-
other TRA allocated the tax benefit of deductions from compensatory
stock option deductions exclusively to the historic shareholders of the
company that issued the options.176 All of these examples show that
when, for whatever reason, significant tax asset pricing problems exist,
TRAs can be a solution.
There have also been Up-C IPOs without TRAs. 177 While TRAs
are motivated by tax asset pricing problems, Up-Cs IPOs are moti-
vated by a desire to keep an existing partnership alive through the
IPO. This motivation can be present even in the absence of any per-
ceived tax asset pricing problem. For example, in what was apparently
the first Up-C IPO--the carveout IPO of barnesandnoble.com-no
TRA was used. 178 Furthermore, as discussed below, the Up-C struc-
ture is increasingly being utilized in non-IPO acquisitive transactions
where tax asset pricing problems are not as acute and are thus imple-
mented without TRAs.
Thus, while TRAs and Up-Cs IPOs often go hand-in-hand, there
have been TRAs without Up-C IPOs and vice versa. This makes
senses as there is no conceptual link between the two phenomena.
TRAs allocate future tax benefits on an ex post, as-realized basis be-
tween buyers and sellers, while Up-C structures allow taxpayers to
keep partnerships alive in acquisitive transactions. As advisors and
the market become more familiar with both TRAs and Up-C struc-
tures, we expect the current factual correlation between the two to
diminish.
Finally, while the tax benefits from Up-Cs are potentially vulnera-
ble to IRS attack under current law, the tax treatment of TRAs ap-
pears to be unassailable. As discussed immediately below, the tax
treatment of TRAs has been criticized on policy grounds. If those
the resulting tax savings back to the exchanging legacy owner. See Hart, note 4, at 45-46;
Shobe, note 62, at 11.
175 See Spirit Airlines, Inc., Tax Receivable Agreement (Form S-1, Exhibit 10.12) (June
1, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1498710/000119312511330952/
d250422dex1012.htm. Likewise, in Up-C IPOs involving blocked foreign and tax-exempt
investors in private investment funds, there is commonly a TRA that allocates benefits
from NOLs of the blocker corporation that is merged into Newco. See Subsection III.A.3.
176 See Endo Pharm. Holding Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Form S-4 (Form S-4/A) (June
14, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100962/000094018000000720/
0000 940180-00-000720-0001.txt; Hart, note 4, at 38-39 (discussing Endo Pharmaceuticals
Holdings Inc.).
177 See Shobe, note 62, at 26 (noting that six recent Up-C IPOs did not include TRAs).
178 See Hart, note 4, at 43-44.
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criticisms were persuasive, a legislative response would be necessary
to discourage or eliminate TRAs. On the other hand, modern Up-Cs
arguably push the limits under current law, so the IRS could legiti-
mately take steps to constrain the growth of Up-Cs, although we ar-
gued above that it would be practically difficult to do so without
similarly impairing UPREITs.
2. Myth #2: TRAs Are a Form of Tax Abuse
Some have argued that TRAs represent nefarious tax strategies that
need to be administratively or legislatively foreclosed. 179 This argu-
ment is closely related to the argument that TRAs are the product of
tax arbitrage, another myth that we debunk below. In fact, TRAs
themselves do not appear to be terribly problematic from a tax
perspective.
TRA transactions begin when the parties choose the optimal tax
structure. This is very commonplace tax planning. For example, as
discussed in Section II.A., a corporate acquisition can be structured as
a taxable asset or taxable stock deal, or perhaps as a tax-free reorgani-
zation. One can surely argue that such options are bad tax policy be-
cause, among other things, they distort business decisions and result in
wasteful tax planning. But once such choices are available, it is not
surprising that they are exploited in all well-planned transactions. In
many situations, there is no need for TRAs because buyers and sellers
can agree on the ex ante value of tax assets and take them into ac-
count in determining the purchase price. In some situations, however,
TRAs are needed because buyers and sellers cannot agree on tax-as-
set value or the valuation exercise is simply not worth the trouble. If
ex ante payment for tax attributes, which goes on all the time, is not
troubling, then ex post payment should not be either.
Accordingly, TRAs themselves are not the problem. If there is any
tax concern, it results from the underlying tax doctrines that allow the
structuring options in the first place. Eliminating or discouraging
TRAs would not be a good solution to this problem. At best, it would
be only a very partial fix because only a small subset of tax planning
activities-those involving acute tax-asset pricing problems-would
be discouraged. Furthermore, it would probably represent only a
temporary fix, as the market could be expected to develop to better
price tax assets or to devise another strategy for dealing with the valu-
ation problem.o80 After all, there is little reason to think that the mar-
179 See Shobe, note 62, at 5.
180 Cf. Shobe, note 62, at 26 (noting that the fact that six recent Up-C IPOs did not
involve TRAs "could... mean that at least some pre-IPO owners believe that the market
has learned to price in tax assets, including the assets created by the Up-C structure.")
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kets would continue to persistently leave tax money on the table in
perpetuity. And even if the law was able to prevent the extraction of
the value of tax assets ex post, the result could be to discourage com-
panies from going public and instead engage in strategic or private
deals (where tax assets are more likely to be valued ex ante), which
itself would be a worrisome tax-created distortion.
While TRAs are a symptom but not the cause of any tax concerns,
they may raise other policy issues. For instance, TRAs might reasona-
bly be questioned on distributional grounds. It may be that TRAs,
which are often used in private-equity backed transactions, dispropor-
tionately benefit already wealthy private equity managers by allowing
their funds (in which they receive carried interest) to effectively buy
tax assets from the public market on the cheap. Considering that pen-
sion funds and endowments are very large owners of both private and
public equity, TRAs can be considered a very expensive (because of
carried interest) way of transferring money from one pocket to an-
other of these public-minded institutions. Relatedly, there might be
concerns that TRA obligations are not adequately disclosed to, and
understood by, the public, allowing legacy owners to "pull a fast one"
over on the public markets.181 But these distributional and disclosure
concerns, while potentially legitimate and serious, are not tax-specific
concerns.
3. Myth #3: TRAs Are a Form of Tax Rate Arbitrage
Another common misconception regarding TRAs is that they re-
present a unique form of tax rate arbitrage.1 82 That is, TRAs uniquely
exploit the difference between the high tax rate on ordinary income
and the lower rate on capital gains, the argument goes.183 Because
they are treated as additional purchase price for the exchanged LLC
interests, TRA payments are often characterized as capital gains by
the legacy owner. Meanwhile, the stepped-up basis itself results in
future ordinary depreciation and amortization deductions for the
buyer. Some commentators view this tax rate arbitrage as the raison
d'etre of the TRA.184 And, in the same spirit, federal legislation has
181 See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 311 (noting that commentators and critics have
argued that supercharged IPOs are "underhanded," "one-sided," and "bizarre," on the
grounds that they are complicated and virtually incomprehensible). But see Shobe, note 4,
at 940-41 (explaining how TRAs are prominently and exhaustively disclosed in SEC
filings).
182 Fleischer & Staudt, note 4; Shobe, note 4, at 917-18, 944.
183 Shobe, note 4, at 918 (describing a "quirk in the tax code ... that allows pre-IPO
owners to pay tax on their sale at reduced capital gains rates, which generates an offsetting
deduction for the corporation at higher corporate tax rates").
184 Id.
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been proposed that would eliminate the arbitrage by taxing all TRA
payments as ordinary income.18 5
The tax rate arbitrage argument is seriously flawed, however. Tax
rate arbitrage is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for using a
TRA. Recall that TRAs arise as a result of pricing problems. Either
the seller values the tax assets more than the buyer or the valuation
exercise is not worth the effort, so the parties agree to exclude the tax
assets from the deal. It is no more complicated than that. While tax
rate arbitrage might appear to correlate with the use of TRAs, there is
no inherent logical connection between the two. In other words, if a
TRA makes sense to resolve valuation problems, it does so regardless
of any tax rate differential between buyer and seller.
In fact, past transactions have used TRAs even in the absence of
any tax rate arbitrage. Consider, for example, carve-out IPOs, where
a parent corporation decides to sell a minority interest in its subsidiary
to the public. 186 To accomplish this, the parent corporation contrib-
utes the stock of the subsidiary to a newly formed corporation, which
is then taken public. Properly structured, the contribution of subsidi-
ary stock to the new corporation is a qualified stock purchase, which
allows for a § 338(h)(10) election. If the election is made, the new
public company receives a stepped-up basis in the assets of the old
corporate subsidiary. This transaction has at least once been accom-
panied by a TRA, which allocated a very large percentage of the re-
sulting tax benefits to the former parent.187 Yet corporations do not
receive a capital gains preference, so there was no tax rate arbitrage
whatsoever.1 8 The parent company is subject to ordinary income tax
rates on the TRA payments it receives, and the new public company
receives future ordinary deductions from the stepped-up basis.189 This
shows that tax rate arbitrage is not a necessary condition for TRA
utilization.
185 See Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007, H.R. 3996, 110th Cong. § 613.
186 See Ugur Celikyurt, Meril Sevilir & Anil Shivdasani, Going Public to Acquire? The
Acquisition Motive in IPOs, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 345 (2010).
187 See note 7 and accompanying text.
188 Shobe, note 4, at 948 n.138 (noting that the section "338(h)(10) supercharged IPO ...
does not benefit from tax arbitrage because it involves two corporations rather than a
partnership and corporation, and thus does not qualify for preferential capital gains rates
that allow for tax arbitrage").
189 The § 338(h)(10) election is still tax-efficient even though there is no tax rate arbi-
trage. Without the election, the seller will often recognize the same (or nearly the same)
amount of gain (though the character of the gains will be somewhat different), while the
buyer would receive a low carryover basis. Given the lack of a capital gains preference for
the seller in this context, the seller's tax liability often will not be affected by the election in
any material way, while the buyer receives a significant benefit from the stepped-up basis,
so overall the election is tax-efficient.
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More importantly, tax rate arbitrage is not a sufficient condition for
TRA utilization. The tax rate arbitrage cited by TRA critics is ex-
tremely common in sales of businesses. When any business operated
as a sole proprietorship or partnership is sold, a significant portion of
the sales proceeds is often allocable to goodwill.190 The result is low-
rate capital gains for the sole proprietor or the individual partners of
the selling partnership. Meanwhile, the buyer receives a stepped-up
basis in the goodwill, which will generate future ordinary deductions.
In the overwhelming majority of these transactions, TRAs are not
necessary because buyers are willing to pay a reasonable premium for
the stepped-up basis.191 In other words, the harshly criticized "tax
rate arbitrage" actually goes on all the time in everyday transactions
that do not involve TRAs.
In fact, the TRA has three other necessary and sufficient condi-
tions: (1) there must be some tax assets transferred to, or created by,
the buyer in connection with the transaction; (2) the seller must value
those tax assets more than the buyer or the valuation of those assets
must be costly; and (3) the seller's premium valuation of the assets,
combined with the cost of valuation, must be sufficiently high to out-
weigh the cost of negotiating, drafting, and administering a TRA. Tax
rate arbitrage proves completely irrelevant.
Consequently, the legislative proposals to recharacterize TRA pay-
ments as ordinary income were misguided. 192 If the proposal was en-
acted, TRAs would continue to exist in cases where valuation
problems were present. Meanwhile, tax rate arbitrage would continue
to occur in the many situations where tax assets are valued ex ante.
The best that can be said for the proposals is that they probably would
reduce the amount of TRA utilization (because TRAs would be un-
duly costly in certain cases due to the higher tax rate on the payments)
and very modestly reduce the amount of tax rate arbitrage. But this is
a very roundabout way of tax policymaking. If tax rate arbitrage is
problematic, it should be dealt with directly. One should not rely on
idiosyncratic, and possibly temporary, mispricing in one segment of
the market to solve a widespread problem.
4. Myth #4: TRAs Are a Quid Pro Quo for a Legacy Owner's Tax
Burden
Another common myth is that TRAs compensate the legacy owners
for the tax burden they incur in connection with the creation of the tax
190 Shobe, note 4, at 929.
191 See Paul & Sabbah, note 4.
192 See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 334 n.102 (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 110-431 (2007)
and the likelihood of other legislative proposals targeting TRAs).
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assets subject to the TRA 193 For instance, in an Up-C IPO, a
stepped-up basis is created each time a legacy owner exchanges an
LLC unit for Newco stock. The legacy owner is taxed on the exchange
at the same time. As a result, some have argued that TRAs are justi-
fied because they compensate the seller for this simultaneous tax bur-
den. However, this argument is flawed.
First, in Up-C IPOs there are no significant marginal tax burdens on
legacy owners. They generally will not exchange their LLC units for
Newco stock until the time they are ready to liquidate their interests
into cash, at which point a taxable event is inevitable. There is there-
fore no acceleration of any taxable event, as compared with the tradi-
tional IPO structure. 194 It is true that the exchange may result in some
ordinary income under § 751(a), while in the traditional IPO structure
all of the gain would be capital gain. But the resulting marginal tax
burden typically will be relatively small because the vast majority of
the sales proceeds are often allocable to capital assets, such as
goodwill. 195
Second, sales prices do not reflect any seller's particular tax bur-
dens. TRA payments are simply part of the purchase price of the leg-
acy owners' LLC units, which is determined by supply and demand. 196
Just like a home buyer does not care whether or not a seller will pay
tax on the sale of a home in determining an offer price, the buyer in
an Up-C IPO (the public market) does not care about the legacy own-
ers' tax situation.
193 See Jeffrey J. Rosen & Peter A. Furci, Monetizing the Shield: Tax Receivable
Agreements in Private Equity Deals, Debevoise & Plimpton Priv. Equity Rep., Fall 2010,
at 9, 23 (TRAs have a "certain symmetry because existing owners receive tax benefits
associated with a tax liability they have borne").
194 See Shobe, note 4, at 929, 946.
195 The legacy owner will also realize some ordinary income on the ultimate receipt of
TRA payments, because a portion of the payments will be characterized as imputed inter-
est. IRC § 483. This additional ordinary income should not be considered a marginal tax
burden incurred by the legacy owner (as compared to their results under the traditional
structure) because the imputed interest payments compensate the owner for the delay in
receiving a portion of their sales proceeds, and interest income characterization for delay
payments is appropriate. In the traditional IPO structure, the legacy owner generally re-
ceives all of his sale proceeds immediately on the sale of his stock in the public company,
whereas in the Up-C IPO, the legacy owner receives some of the sales proceeds over time
(through TRA payments). If, in a traditional IPO, the legacy owner received some of the
sales proceeds over time (for example, in an installment sale), then the portion that com-
pensates the owner for delay generally would be taxed as ordinary income, just as in the
Up-C IPO. See Shobe, note 62, at 33.
196 See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 364 ("If the legislative approach is restricted to
deals with TRAs, it would change the tax treatment associated with the tax benefits of
amortization shared through a TRA but would not address deals that accomplished exactly
the same outcome with a higher purchase price or an up-front lump-sum payment, two
alternatives to the TRA.").
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V. THE UP-C REVOLUTION
We previously explained the burgeoning use of the Up-C structure
when LLCs are taken public.1 97 However, the revolutionary impact of
the Up-C structure goes well beyond IPOs. As detailed below, Up-Cs
can be used to optimize the tax effects of almost any combination of
two (or more) public companies, including inversions of U.S. public
companies. While the Up-C structure is still relatively new, it seems
that a tipping point has been reached regarding market acceptance
and advisor awareness of the structure. Absent intervention by either
the IRS, Treasury, or Congress, there is little doubt that the Up-C is
here to stay.
The Up-C structure combines three attractive tax features: (1) a
single level of tax on the business's income (as well as flow-through of
losses) generated by the subsidiary partnership attributable to legacy
owners, (2) significant liquidity for legacy owners due to the exchange
rights, and (3) the absence of any limitations on the type of business
activities that may be undertaken. Each feature by itself is common-
place in the U.S. tax system. Partnerships, S corporations, and REITs
all provide a single level of tax, publicly traded stock provides signifi-
cant liquidity for holders, and C corporations, S corporations, and
partnerships-the most common tax classifications-may engage in
any type of business activity.
Further, the combination of two out of these three features, while
atypical, is not wholly unprecedented. For example, while most PTPs
are subject to corporate tax, certain PTPs-such as public oil & gas
master limited partnerships-are exempt from the tax. REITs like-
wise can combine public trading and single-level taxation. But exempt
PTPs and REITs are strictly limited in the type of business activities in
which they can engage. What is revolutionary about the Up-C is the
unique combination of all three features into a single structure.1 98
This Part considers the implications of the Up-C revolution. First, it
discusses the impact of Up-Cs outside of the specific LLC IPO con-
text. Then it addresses the normative tax policy issues raised by the
Up-C Revolution.
A. Implications of the Up-C Revolution: Beyond the Up-IPO
The Up-C structure has already significantly altered the way that
IPOs of LLCs are structured. The new Up-C IPO structure, in turn,
should have ripple effects on earlier structuring decisions, such as ini-
tial choice-of-entity planning. In addition, given the growing familiar-
197 See Section III.A.
198 Shobe, note 4, at 955 (noting the unprecedented tax benefits of Up-C IPOs).
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ity and comfort with the Up-C structure, there is no reason to think
the structure will not continue to expand into other contexts, public
company combinations or inversions.
1. Choice-of-Entity for Start-Ups and VC- or PE Backed
Companies
Traditionally, start-ups that sought VC funding would be initially
formed as C corporations. 199 Even if a business made it out of the
start-up phase as a partnership, VC or PE funds would often require
the entity to convert to a C corporation before they would invest in
it.200 This preference for the corporate form has puzzled tax experts
for some time. Outside of the VC/PE context, partnerships are over-
whelmingly preferred for a number of reasons, the most important of
which are: (1) the single level of tax of gains, (2) the flow-through of
losses, and (3) the ability to deliver a stepped-up basis to a buyer on
exit (and to receive a corresponding premium purchase price).201
Why then have VC- and PE-backed businesses routinely bucked this
trend and insisted on the corporate form?
Traditional explanations are based on the notion that, due to unique
facts in the VC/PE context, the claimed benefits were not as signifi-
199 See Bankman, note 3, at 1750.
200 See generally note 3 and accompanying text (discussing why VC funds continue to
form and fund C Corporations).
201 Levin & Rocap, note 104, ¶ 302.1.1 to 302.1.4, at 3-20-3-37. The last benefit-the
ability to deliver a stepped-up basis without double taxation-can be viewed as a specific
application of the first benefit-single level of tax on gain-but given its importance (to
both taxpayers and this Article), we highlight it separately. The partnership form also
preserves the capital gains preference as capital gains flow through the entity. IRC § 701.
In contrast, there is no capital gains preference available to corporations. In addition,
there are benefits to the partnership form vis-A-vis S corporations. For instance, property
contributions and distributions are generally tax-free when made to or by partnerships,
§§ 721 and 731, while they are generally taxable when made to or by S corporations, IRC
§§ 351 and 311. In any event, S corporations cannot have owners who are partnerships,
which most VC and PE funds are, so these entities would not be able to accept the funds'
capital investments. Partnership characterization also preserves flexibility as to the choice
of entity. It is much easier to convert from a partnership to a corporation as opposed to
vice versa. Incorporation of a partnership generally is tax-free under § 351, while "de-
corporation" of a corporation into a partnership is a taxable event under § 311. Thus, only
partnership status preserves optionality, which may prove useful in unforeseen circum-
stances, such as where relative effective tax rates of individuals versus corporations are
altered. For example, when Congress periodically and temporarily expanded the § 1202
exclusion for certain gains on small business company stock, certain partnerships were able
to exploit the expansions through timely conversions to corporate status. See Tony
Nitti, With Tax Break Set To Expire, Partnerships Should Consider Converting to C Cor-
porations Before Year End, Forbes (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
anthonynitti/2013/12/18/with-tax-break-set-to-expire-partnerships-should-consider-con-
verting-to-c-corporations-before-year-en/#34f0acce5351.
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cant as they might appear.202 For instance, a single level of tax is gen-
erally only important if the company, first, has profits, and second,
distributes these profits to its owners. Start-up businesses (which are
the province of VC funds) often do not realize profits for many years.
PE-backed businesses may realize profits but they ordinarily will not
distribute them; instead they generally use the profits to pay down
debt or grow the business in anticipation of going public or a sale to a
strategic buyer.203 In addition, even if a company distributed profits,
to the extent those profits are attributable to foreign and tax-exempt
investors,204 any flow-through profits would ordinarily need to be allo-
cated to corporate "blockers" who would themselves pay corporate
tax. Foreign and tax-exempt investors make up a large portion of the
investment in VC/PE funds 205 and, therefore, corporate tax is often
inevitable for a significant portion of the company's profits.
Likewise, the actual benefit of loss flow-through is often smaller
than it may appear. Corporate classification generally changes the
character of losses from ordinary to capital losses; it does not elimi-
nate the losses entirely. 206 In addition, timing is often unaffected for
individual investors due to the passive loss limitations in § 469.207
And, of course, foreign and tax-exempt investors do not care about
losses, as they generally do not pay U.S. taxes.208
Turning to the third major benefit-the ability to deliver a stepped-
up basis to a buyer and fetch the accompanying premium-the per-
ceived unwillingness of the public market to pay for the stepped-up
basis substantially diminished the value of this benefit to VC and PE
202 See, e.g., Bankman, note 3, at 1753 (noting that many individual VC investors would
not be able to take loss deductions due to the passive loss rules under § 469).
203 Using profits to pay down debt or grow the business will increase the capital gains
inherent in the owner's stock, which is a second level of tax. However, deferral and the
ability to use cherry-picked capital losses to offset those ultimate gains can vastly diminish
the effective rate on those capital gains. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H.
Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1992).
204 Foreign and tax-exempt investors invest through a blocker corporation in order to
avoid filing requirements and generating unrelated trade or business income, respectively.
See Levin & Rocap, note 104, 1 1001.1, at 10-11.
205 See Omri Marian, The Other Eighty Percent: Private Investment Funds, Interna-
tional Tax Avoidance, and Tax-Exempt Investors, 2016 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1715 (2016).
206 See Johnson, note 3. When losses are generated by an operating partnership, the
losses that flow through to the owners are generally ordinary losses. See IRC § 701. When
losses are generated by a C corporation, the losses result in capital losses (or reduced
capital gains, if the business is ultimately successful) when the investor's stock is sold. IRC
§ 165(f). Thus, from the owner's perspective, the losses do not evaporate when they are
recognized in corporate form but instead are converted to capital losses. In theory, timing
is affected, because the recognition of the losses is delayed from the time they are realized
by the business to the time when the stock is sold, but the § 469 limitation on passive losses
often synchronizes the timing.
207 See Fleischer, note 3, at 154.
208 See generally IRC §§ 501, 871, 881.
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owners. The typical ultimate exit for VC/PE-backed businesses is ei-
ther to take the portfolio company public or to sell it to a public com-
pany.209 In either case, the market's perceived indifference to the
stepped-up basis (because of its fixation on accounting earnings)
would mean that the VC/PE fund would not get compensated in full
for delivering the stepped-up basis.
Taken together, these three major benefits of initially organizing as
an LLC apparently, after taking account the practical realities that di-
minish their value, did not outweigh the perceived problems of using
that form. The perceived problems were varied. Founders, investors,
and advisors are less familiar with LLCs than corporations. 210 Per-
haps most important, LLCs introduced greater transaction costs and
complexity compared to corporations. 211 Because of flow-through
taxation, the activities of an LLC would directly impact the owners'
tax situation, whereas corporate owners would be affected only if and
when distributions of cash or property were made to them. As a re-
sult, before owners of LLCs could prepare and file their own tax re-
turns, the LLCs had to first file their tax returns and deliver Form K-
is to the owners. Relatedly, if an LLC did business in multiple states,
each owner of the LLC generally would have to file state tax returns
in each of those states; this would not be the case if the business were
operated as C corporation. 212
Flow-through taxation also requires more complicated organiza-
tional documents, which results in greater costs in drafting and ad-
ministering their provisions. LLC agreements must include complex
tax accounting provisions to allocate gains and losses to the owners
and minimum tax distribution provisions to ensure that owners would
have the liquidity necessary to pay tax on flow-through gains. 213
There is no comparable need for these provisions in a shareholder's
agreement for a C corporation because these concerns stem from
flow-through taxation. Likewise, incentive compensation is more
complex in the partnership context. Incentive compensation granted
209 Another typical exit is a secondary sale to another investment fund. For example, a
VC fund may sell an interest in a portfolio company to another VC fund or to a PE fund.
In those cases, the ultimate eventual exit would hopefully be an IPO or sale to a public
company. Thus, the valuation in the secondary sale would be a function of the ultimate
desired exit and, because of the perceived tax asset pricing problem, the valuation would
be depressed in the secondary sale even though it did not directly involve the public mar-
kets. See Levin & Rocap, note 104, ¶ 105.6, at 1-12.
210 See Johnson, note 3, at 60-61.
211 See Gregg D. Polsky, Explaining Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-
Ups, 70 Hastings L. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 20-30), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3123793.
212 If the business were operated as a C corporation, only the C corporation would file
tax returns in each state in which it engaged in business.
213 See Levin & Rocap, note 104, ¶ 1002.3, at 10-14.
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by C corporations is usually paid in the form of stock options or re-
stricted stock, which are well understood and easy to effectuate. On
the other hand, incentive compensation in the partnership context
usually involves the periodic granting of profits interests, which are
more complicated and far less well understood.2 14 In addition, be-
cause subchapter K is so notoriously complicated, intricate "tax boil-
erplate" provisions are required in LLC agreements. 2 1 5 Finally,
because tax-exempt and foreign investors necessitate blockers, the
ownership structure of an LLC portfolio investment is more unwieldly
than an analogous C corporation investment. 2 1 6
After weighing the pros and cons of corporate versus partnership
classification, VC and PE firms traditionally preferred the corporate
form.2 17 While the costs may appear pedestrian and minor (and
shrinking each day, as familiarity with LLCs grows), the benefits, tak-
ing into account the practical limitations, have been considered even
smaller.
The Up-C revolution could significantly alter this historical calculus,
perhaps turning the preference for C corporations on its head. Up-C
IPOs now allow the legacy owners (including VC and PE funds) to
monetize the value of stepped-up basis in the form of TRA pay-
ments.218 Since this increases the returns of the legacy owners, the
prospect of an Up-C IPO should put a thumb on the scales in favor of
initially choosing the LLC form for start-ups and of maintaining that
form when new investment is solicited.219 Some recent high-profile
Up-C IPOs, including those of GoDaddy.com, Shake Shack, and
SoulCycle, have made the benefits of remaining a partnership until
and through an IPO particularly salient. It is therefore possible that
the Up-C revolution will in turn spur an LLC revolution in the VC
and PE worlds.
214 See Bankman, note 3, at 1751 (noting that a venture capitalist said, "[m]anagement
gets spooked by partnership interests").
215 See John M. Cunningham, What Federal Tax Provisions Should Be Included in the
LLC Agreements of Multi-Member LLCs Taxable as Partnerships-And Why? (June 25,
2007), http://www.llcformations.com/pdf/Issue%2044%20-%20purpose%200f%20pte%20
tax%20provisions%20-%20overview%20-%206-25-07.pdf.
216 See notes 204-05.
217 See note 3.
218 See Fleischer & Staudt, note 4, at 322-23.
219 The benefits for foreign and tax-exempt investors in VC/PE funds are somewhat
more complicated, because they invest through a blocker corporation. In the Up-C IPO,
the blocker corporation typically is merged into Newco, which allows Newco to inherit any
NOLs of the blocker. The blocker generally receives the benefit of a TRA, which provides
that the blocker will receive a specified percentage of the tax reduction resulting from the
NOLs. Thus, even foreign and tax-exempt investors benefit from the Up-C IPO structure
because the traditional IPO structure did not include any TRAs. See Hart, note 4, at 52-
54.
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2. Employee Compensation Design for Start-Ups
Even if many start-ups continue to be organized as C corporations,
the Up-C revolution may influence the manner in which start-ups
compensate their founders and other early employees. Traditionally,
"founder's stock" was sold to these employees for nominal value, and
the parties claimed that the nominal value equaled the fair market
value of the stock. Aggressive tax planning was often used to try to
push down the value of the founder's stock to reduce the price that
the employee had to pay.2 2 0 This was done to reduce the likelihood
that the transaction would be treated as a compensatory bargain sale,
in which case the founder would realize immediate ordinary income
on the transaction. The tax benefit of using founder's stock is that the
employee's ultimate gain on the stock was taxed only when it was sold
and then only at capital gains rates.2 21 However, the downside of
founder's stock was that the start-up would get no tax deductions at-
tributable to the founder's stock.222
A different approach would be for the start-up to issue nonqualified
stock options (NQSOs). While NOSOs would result in ordinary in-
come to the founder on exercise, they also provide a corresponding
deduction to the employer. Viewed in the aggregate, NQSOs often
will be more tax-efficient than founder's stock.223 Yet, the current ap-
proach is to use founder's stock, which seems irrational. The market's
perceived unwillingness to pay for tax assets may explain this phe-
nomenon. NOSO exercises before an IPO will add to the company's
NOLs (assuming that the company is not yet profitable on a cumula-
tive basis at the time of the IPO), while NQSO exercises after an IPO
will result in future deductions. In either case, an efficient market
should price these tax attributes into the IPO price (and later stock
prices). If the market does not do so, founder's stock may be more
efficient than NQSOs. The conventional wisdom that the market does
not correctly price tax assets therefore may explain the seemingly tax-
inefficient choice of founder's stock over NQSOs. 2 2 4
With the popularity of TRAs, there is now a tried and true method
to capturing the value of tax assets in IPOs (or in sales to public com-
panies).225 Thus, one might expect start-up corporations to prefer to
220 See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Examining the Tax Advantage of Founders'
Stock, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1085 (2012); see also Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Under-
standing Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock,
116 Harv. L. Rev. 874 (2003).
221 See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 60 (2011).
222 Polsky & Hellwig, note 220, at 1103-04.
223 See id.
224 See notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
225 See Paul & Sabbah, note 4.
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issue NQSOs over founder's stock and then, when the corporation
goes public or is sold to a public company, for the corporation's pre-
IPO investors to enter into a TRA with the corporation to extract the
value of the deductions that will be realized as a result of NQSO
exercises.
3. Alternative to Tax-Free Reorganizations
As explained previously, corporate acquisitions can qualify as tax-
free reorganizations if certain conditions are satisfied.226 Sometimes
one or more of the conditions are problematic, making a tax-free reor-
ganization unattractive. In these case, tax planners often devise other
structures that provide similar if not identical tax consequences as re-
organizations. Up-C structures should now be added to the tax plan-
ner's tool kit, and in fact, they can provide even better tax results than
reorganizations.
For example, assume that public P wants to buy certain assets of T
for P stock. Because the assets do not constitute "all or substantially
all of the assets of T," a tax-free reorganization is not possible. 227 Tra-
ditionally, planners would deal with this problem by recommending
that the parties use the "horizontal double dummy" structure. In that
structure, a Newco is formed to, in effect, replace P. P shareholders
contribute their P stock to Newco, getting back Newco stock.228 T
simultaneously contributes the desired assets to Newco in exchange
for Newco stock. The contributions qualify as a good § 351 transac-
tion, and the tax consequences are similar to those resulting from a
tax-free reorganization. 229 T defers its gain on the subject assets until
it sells Newco stock, but there is no stepped-up basis in those assets.
By delinking deferral and carryover basis, however, an Up-C struc-
ture can provide even better tax results. Instead of structuring the
acquisition of the subject T assets as a horizontal double dummy, the
acquisition can be structured using an Up-C. P and T would form a
subsidiary LLC. P would contribute all of its assets to the LLC, while
T would contribute only the desired assets. P and T would each re-
ceive LLC units commensurate with the respective value of their con-
tributions. 7s LLC units would be exchangeable into P stock. Prior
226 IRC § 368; See Section II.A.
227 See IRC § 368(a)(1)(C).
228 See Ginsburg et al., note 4, $ 904. Technically, these contributions will be effected
using a reverse triangular merger, with Newco as the surviving parent corporation and a
"dummy" corporation serving as the subsidiary of Newco that is merged with P, which
survives the merger. In traditional horizontal double dummy transactions, T would engage
in another similar reverse triangular merger that would take place with a second dummy
subsidiary of Newco (with T surviving).
229 Id.
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to the exercise of those exchange rights, the transaction is taxed the
same as a reorganization; in particular, T recognizes no gain and its
basis in the contributed assets carries over to Ts LLC units. How-
ever, when T desires liquidity and exercises its exchange rights, P will
now receive a stepped-up basis in the T assets. In a reorganization or
horizontal double dummy structure, there is no such stepped-up basis.
This is another example, in addition to the Up-C IPO, where an Up-
C structure uniquely delinks deferral and carryover basis. Rather
than forcing taxpayers to choose between the two, Up-Cs allow them
to provide both deferral to roll-over investors and an eventual
stepped-up basis to the buyer.
4. International Implications
In response to the first-wave of corporate inversions, Treasury
adopted § 1.367(a)-3(c) (the "anti-Helen of Troy regulations").
Under these regulations, if a U.S. corporation is acquired by a foreign
corporation in which more than 50% of the shares of the foreign cor-
poration are owned by former shareholders of the U.S. corporation,
the shareholders of the U.S. target would not be able to receive the
benefits of a tax-free reorganization and, accordingly, they would be
taxed as if they sold the shares of the U.S. corporation for cash. These
regulations effectively impeded inversions involving significant tax-
sensitive shareholders (although they did little to stop inversions by
public corporations with mostly tax-indifferent shareholders) by creat-
ing adversity between the tax interests of the shareholders and the tax
interests of the corporation. 230
An Up-C can be used to eliminate this adversity by permitting tax-
sensitive shareholders who desire tax deferral to contribute their
shares to a subsidiary partnership (with exchange rights to swap the
partnership interests for the foreign acquirer's stock), while other
shareholders can simply receive cash from the foreign acquirer. This
structure was reportedly utilized in the Burger King/Tim Hortons
transaction to provide tax deferral to the U.S. shareholders of Burger
King while inverting the company to Canada.231
A similar structure was used in the recent Avago/Broadcom trans-
action. A conventional acquisition of California-based Broadcom by
Avago, a Swiss company, would have triggered the anti-Helen of Troy
230 Brandon Hayes, US Anti-Inversion Provisions, Int'l Tax Rev. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://
www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3181949[US-anti-inversion-provisions.html.
231 See, e.g., Samuel C. Thompson Jr., The Cat-and-Mouse Inversion Game with Burger
King, 144 Tax Notes 11 (Sept. 15, 2014).
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regulations. 232 The acquisition was instead structured as an Up-C in
which shareholders of Broadcom could elect to exchange their
Broadcom shares for publicly-traded stock in the new foreign parent
company, for cash, or for units in the subsidiary partnership exchange-
able into new foreign parent company stock. The merger was con-
summated in February 2016, and, because a sufficient number of
Broadcom U.S. shareholders received cash or partnership interests
(and not parent company stock), the acquisition avoided the applica-
tion of the anti-Helen of Troy regulations. 233
B. Policy Issues and Fundamental Reform of Entity Taxation
Under current law, Up-C structures would probably survive an IRS
challenge. The relevant doctrinal principles were developed with
UPREITs, not Up-Cs, in mind and UPREITs involve dramatically dif-
ferent tax and policy issues.234 For better or for worse, REITs have
been blessed by Congress to receive significant unique tax benefits
because of real estate activities. UPREITs were then blessed by Trea-
sury, through a favorable example in the partnership anti-abuse regu-
lations and narrow interpretations of the concept of "public trading"
under § 7704. These taxpayer friendly provisions were presumably in-
tended to facilitate the formations of, and contributions to, REITs.
Up-C proponents have argued by analogy that these favorable doc-
trines extend to Up-Cs despite the completely different context.235 As
a matter of current doctrine, this argument is persuasive because
UPREITs and Up-Cs are identical in their technical aspects. But
Treasury, through regulations, or Congress, through legislation, clearly
has the power to address Up-Cs prospectively. The policy question is
whether they should take up this cause.
A narrow technical objection to Up-Cs would focus on the ex-
change rights. These exchange rights are very artificial instruments
that one would not expect to see "in nature." Instead, they are com-
pletely a creature of tax planning, designed exclusively to facilitate a
232 See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, Avago's Pending Broadcom Purchase Taps Arcane Tax Struc-
ture, Wall St. J. (May 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/avagos-pending-broadcom-
purchase-taps-arcane-tax-structure-1432847788. The Avago/Broadcom transaction also
implicates the international aspects of the Up-C discussed in Subsection V.A.4. because
Avago was based in Switzerland and the combined company is resident in Switzerland. See
generally Amanda Athanasiou, No IRS Ruling for Avago's Acquisition of Broadcom, 148
Tax Notes 814 (Aug. 18, 2015).
233 See Broadcom Limited Announces Final Broadcom Corporation Merger Considera-
tion Election Results (Feb. 1, 2016), http://investors.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml
?c=203541&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2134462.
234 See Shobe, note 4, at 955-58.
235 See note 132.
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favorable tax result. Such tax-only instruments are rightfully disfa-
vored in tax. They distort business decisions, complicate transactions
and structures, reward aggressive planning, and foster disrespect for
the tax system, while doing nothing useful for society. Policymakers
concerned by this might clarify the circumstances when exchange
rights cause the subsidiary partnership to become classified as publicly
traded. The regulations under § 7704 merely provide a safe harbor,
one that modern planners apparently are not willing to comply with in
both UPREIT and Up-C contexts. 236 If the safe harbor were turned
into an unsafe harbor, so that limitations on exchanges had to be at
least as onerous as the ones in the regulation to avoid public trading
characterization, Up-C structures would be less attractive. 237 This
would not solve the problem of the exchange rights being a tax-only
instrument, but it would at least require a substantial change in the
economics of the transaction to achieve a desired tax result. In other
words, at least the tax-favored transaction would be materially differ-
ent than the alternative one, and this might be enough to deter many
of the Up-C transactions.
More broadly, one might object to the Up-C as "too clever by half"
transactions that threaten the corporate tax base. 2 3 8 Up-Cs keep a
partnership alive while providing for owner liquidity akin to public
trading-a heretofore unprecedented tax result in the modern tax sys-
tem, where public trading is the hallmark of C corporation status for
active businesses not involving real estate. At first glance, allowing
the partnership to stay alive appears to reduce corporate tax revenues
by subjecting some of the business's income (that is, that which is not
allocable to the C corporation parent) to single-level taxation and al-
lowing for a future stepped-up basis, which will shelter future income
of the parent corporation from corporate tax.2 3 9
The long-run consequences from the Up-C Revolution, however,
are much more complicated because taxpayer behavior is dynamic.
By avoiding some of the sting of the corporate tax, Up-C IPOs reduce
the costs of a partnership going public. In turn, if Up-Cs were discour-
aged or disallowed, some partnerships that would have used an Up-C
IPO to go public simply might not go public, instead preferring to re-
main private and maintain pass-through classification. On the other
hand, if Up-Cs are unrestrained, many privately-held partnerships
that might have remained private may in fact go public, meaning that
eventually (for example, after all legacy owners have exchanged) all of
236 Reg. § 1.7704-1(f); see Subsection III.B.1.
237 See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
1312 (2001).
238 See, e.g., Shobe, note 4, at 945.
239 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89, 112-13 n.130 (2008).
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the business's income will be subject to the corporate tax. On the
other hand, if Up-Cs are unrestrained then some start-ups might ini-
tially be formed as LLCs instead of corporations, as we previously
argued, 240 which could reduce future corporate tax revenues. The
long-run net result on corporate tax revenues is unclear.
Ultimately, therefore, from a tax policy standpoint one's take on the
Up-C depends intrinsically on one's view of the corporate tax gener-
ally. Many observers believe that the corporate tax ought to be elimi-
nated in favor of some type of universal single-level tax of business
income; 241 they would view the Up-C as a step in the right direction.
Others view the corporate tax as a necessary evil, arguing that while
universal single-level taxation would be theoretically optimal, it is too
difficult to administer when the number of equity holders grows too
large or the capital structure too complex.242 Such observers would
view the Up-C Revolution as a good thing as it shrinks the corporate
tax base without undue complexity. Others might be agnostic on the
philosophical merits of the corporate tax, but still believe that is a nec-
essary and important revenue source.243 For them, the empirical ques-
tion of whether Up-Cs will, over time, lead to more or less tax revenue
would be critical. Regardless, the key takeaway is that many of the
objections to the Up-C structure are more properly attributed to
larger normative concerns about the corporate tax regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Up-C Revolution has begun. Up-Cs already appear to have
become the dominant means by which LLCs go public, and Up-C
structures are showing up in a host of other contexts. Up-Cs provide
240 Subsection IV.A.1.
241 See Thomas D. Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
and the ALI Proposals, 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 715 (1983); Edward D. Kleinbard, The
Business Enterprise Income Tax: A Prospectus, 106 Tax Notes 97 (Jan. 3, 2005). The Sen-
ate Finance Committee reportedly has considered a dividends-paid deduction integration
proposal on a number of occasions. See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integra-
tion of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes, 69 Nat'l Tax J. 677, 690 (2016).
242 See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate In-
come, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239 (2003). Others have defended the corporate tax as a
regulatory tool of the state. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the
State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004).
243 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Cor-
porate Income, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613 (1990). In addition, a robust literature on the prag-
matic issues facing corporate integration has developed as well. See, e.g., Deborah H.
Schenk, Complete Integration in a Partial Integration World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 697 (1992);
Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully Not at All): A Practi-
tioner's Comparison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 47 Tax L. Rev. 509
(1992); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal,
47 Tax L. Rev. 431 (1992).
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unprecedented tax benefits, and the only real cost seems to stem from
the additional complexity of the structure. But as advisors and the
market become increasingly familiar and comfortable with the struc-
ture, this cost will rapidly diminish. Absent an intervention from
policymakers, it appears the Up-C is here to stay.
While there has been skepticism of Up-Cs in some quarters, many
of the critiques are based on misunderstandings, myths, or mispercep-
tions. Under close inspection the Up-C structure seems to be on solid
footing under current tax doctrine, which should not be surprising
given that the technical details have been adopted from existing
UPREIT structures. The more difficult question is whether the Up-C
Revolution should be concerning from a tax policy perspective. We
conclude that the answer ultimately depends on one's view of the
modern corporate tax system rather than on the Up-C structure itself.
Skeptics of the corporate tax should embrace the Up-C as a market
solution to distortions caused, at least in part, by the corporate tax.
More surprisingly, however, even proponents of the corporate tax
should not necessarily oppose the Up-C out of hand. Instead, if rais-
ing revenue is the sole or even primary goal of the corporate tax, the
issue ultimately turns on the empirical question of whether the Up-C
would reduce or, perhaps counter-intuitively, increase total corporate
tax revenues in the long-run, once taxpayer responses are taken into
account.
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